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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:

Investigating implementation of the ISPS
Code in the Republic of Azerbaijan

Degree:

Master of Science

After the 9/11 terror attacks in the US, security became a primary concern for the
shipping industry. This catastrophic event raised the awareness of the international
maritime community, including the International Maritime Organization (IMO) of
the need for a new global legal framework that addresses security risks and
establishes mitigation measures to enhance the security level within the maritime
field. At the same time, this new intervention should influence the existing safety
measures, especially within the context of the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
SOLAS was amended in 2002, and security issues became an inseparable part of the
Convention. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) was
made part of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 – Special measures to enhance maritime security,
that entered into force in 2004.
The ISPS Code was adopted with the objective of establishing international
cooperation between contracting governments, governmental agencies, national
administrations, as well as shipping companies and port facilities for evaluating and
identifying security threats to ships and port facilities. Furthermore, the Code
describes the duties and liabilities of all concerned parties responsible for maritime
security at national, regional, and international levels.
The Republic of Azerbaijan has been an IMO member state since 1995 and party to
SOLAS since 1997. The State Maritime Agency (SMA) is the authorized
Organization for the implementation of the provisions of SOLAS and the ISPS Code
on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The SMA is fully
provided with national policy, legal acts, and regulations for implementation and
enforcement of the ISPS Code.
The aim of this dissertation was to examine the level of conformity with the
requirements of the ISPS code at the port facilities of Azerbaijan. The research also
touched upon the different safety and security measures within the different port
facilities. Finally, it identified areas that were suitable for further improvement.
KEYWORDS: Maritime security, SOLAS, the ISPS Code, Port Facility Security
Plan, Port Facility Security Officer, Verification, Training, Certification.
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1. Introduction

1.1 General overview
There are two very important terms that describe risks and threats in the maritime
field: “safety” and “security”. These words sound fundamentally synonymous;
however, it is necessary to differentiate their meaning and impact in the maritime
sector. It is indicative, according to Mejia (2002), that safety is designed to protect
people from maritime accidents caused by unsafe operation of ships; on the other
hand, security aiming at protecting the crew and ship from criminal intent. In short,
safety concerns unintentional acts against ships, crews, or environment; in contrast,
security involves intentional act against maritime actors.
For example, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
relates to safety at sea, the Convention for the suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) and the International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), which is the SOLAS chapter XI-2, apply to
security at sea. According to Dalaklis (2017), the International Safety Management
Code (ISM) is about mitigating the maritime risks with reference to the safety scope
whereas the (ISPS) code is about the security side of the maritime operations.
Furthermore, maritime security can be defined as “protecting measures against
threats, piracy, unlawful acts and other types of attacks are taken by actors of
maritime industry such as ship owners, operators, and administrators of vessels, port
facilities and other maritime organizations” (Mejia, 2002).
The importance of maritime safety and security is well recognized at the global level,
especially after various maritime incidents that caused major harm to human beings,
property and the marine environment. Holding a pivotal role, the UN started to pay
attention to the ships` security against piratical attacks in 1982 through UNCLOS.
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For example, Part VII, Section I, from Article 100 to 108, consists of relevant
provisions against piracy attacks and other crimes at sea. All States shall cooperate in
the suppression of unlawful traffic in narcotics and psychotropic substances carried
by ships on the high seas and, in addition, combat piracy (UN, 1982).
Various tragic maritime incidents and accidents through the course of history have
raised the international community`s awareness of the need for specific regulations
to prevent these events from reoccurring. These incidents have had a massive impact
on human safety and have resulted in an enormous number of casualties all around
the world. For example, the accident of the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987
resulted in 193 losses of lives which triggered the International Safety Management
Code (ISM Code). Such events require international cooperation to enhance
maritime safety and security in order to protect human life and property.
Furthermore, there are other major negative results; for instance, the global economy
has had its share of loss, especially when a leading shipping organization in a certain
state loses its market share.
It is well known that the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United
States was catastrophic in terms of loss of lives and property damage. After these
attacks, security became a primary concern for the shipping industry. This
catastrophic event raised the awareness of the international maritime community.
The UN specialized agency that is responsible for regulating maritime safety and
security is the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Under its auspices, the
international maritime community works hard to create rules and regulations that
will help the different states to organize, monitor, and protect their national and
international maritime activities.
It is true that adoption or entry into force of international maritime conventions or
codes has followed disastrous maritime accidents or dangerous threats to human life.
For instance, the Achille Lauro hijacking incident happened on 7 October 1985; the
Italian flagged MS Achille Lauro passenger vessel was hijacked off the coast of
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Egypt by four armed men who represented the Palestine Liberation Front. After that
incident, Resolution A.584 (14) “Measures to prevent unlawful acts which threaten
the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews” was adopted by
IMO. Afterwards, taking into consideration the UN`s request on passenger vessel
safety and security, IMO worked on a new convention and in March 1988 the SUA
Convention was adopted. The Convention came into force on 1 March 1992 (IMO,
n.d.). The main purpose of the Convention is to ensure that relevant measures are
taken against unlawful acts against ships. Additionally, the Convention includes the
hijacking of ships; acts of violence against people on board; and destruction or
damage of ships (SUA, 1982).
The purpose of this research effort is to examine the implementation of the ISPS
Code in the Republic of Azerbaijan, recognizing the importance of maritime security
for the shipping industry and economy of the State. The Republic of Azerbaijan has
been an IMO member state since 1995 and party to SOLAS since 1997. The State Maritime
Agency (SMA) is the authorized Organization for the implementation of the provisions of
SOLAS and the ISPS Code on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

1.2 Background
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) is a paramount
legal toolbox created by the Member States of the IMO, and it relates both to the
security and safety of commercial ships. According to Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS,
Administrations of Contracting States shall set security level and ensure the
provision of security levels information to ships flying under their flags and port
facilities within their territories (SOLAS, 1974). After the terror attacks on 11
September 2001 in the US, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) decided
to pay more attention to maritime security. Furthermore, the IMO organized a
Diplomatic Conference on 9-13 December 2002. Several amendments were adopted
to SOLAS, as well as the new ISPS Code by this Conference (IMO, 2012).
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After the adoption of amendments to SOLAS and the ISPS Code, the contracting
governments started to improve homework of maritime security, in particular on
board ships and at port facilities. Security incidents can be reduced by effective
implementation of the ISPS Code and successful cooperation of government
authorities and by the cooperation of different maritime stakeholders like shipping
companies and port facilities. After the 9/11 terror attacks, everybody started to
worry about the vulnerability of ships, especially the possibility of shipping being
used as a vector for terrorist attacks. As a result, the IMO Assembly in November
2001, called for an assessment of the current international regulations on ships and
port facilities against terrorist attacks and development of measures and procedures
preventing these terror acts as well as improvement of security offshore and ashore.
The main goal was to reduce threats to vessels, crew, cargo, port facility personnel
on board and in port areas, as well as to enhance the security of ships and port
facilities, to minimize the possibility becoming a target of international terrorism
(IMO, n.d.). The ISPS Code entered into force on 1 July 2004.
The ISPS Code applies to different types of ships, such as passenger ships, cargo
ships and high-speed passenger crafts of 500 gross tonnage and above, which are
engaged on international voyages. Moreover, it applies to mobile offshore drilling
units, as well as port facilities that are serving the mentioned ships operating on
international voyages (ISPS, 2002). The ISPS Code is divided into two parts:
mandatory Part A and recommendatory Part B. Part A contains detailed requirements
on security for governments, port facilities and shipping companies and Part B
presents recommendations on how to implement these requirements. Part A includes
contracting governments` obligations for determining the Designated Authority to
conduct duties and responsibilities on maritime security, which are mentioned in the
Code. These responsibilities include setting up maritime security levels and ensuring
the implementation of maritime security measures in all ports (Nordfjeld & Dalaklis,
2018).
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Furthermore, there are many objectives for the ISPS Code, but the ones standing out
are establishing international cooperation among contracting governments, and also
between governmental agencies, as well as national administrations. Additionally,
shipping companies and port administrations, in respect of evaluating and dealing
with security threats to ships and port facilities, can also be part of this cooperation.
Moreover, the Code determines the duties and liabilities of all concerned parties that
are handling the responsibility of maritime security and safety of the ports and ships
at national, regional, and international levels.

1.3. Aims and objectives
The Republic of Azerbaijan, as an IMO member state, applied the ISPS code as part
of SOLAS within its local port facilities as it ratified the convention. However, the
degree of conformity with the Code remains unknown unless it is suitably measured
and tested. Therefore, the aims and objectives of this research were mainly to
examine the level of conformity with ISPS Code regulations and guidelines at the
port facilities of Azerbaijan. The research also briefly examined the different safety
and security measures within the different port facilities and shipping yards;
moreover, it aimed to create an accurate benchmark of how safe and secure these
economically sensitive posts are. Additionally, this research located in certain areas
that are suitable for further improvements.

1.4. Research questions
The research effort aimed answering the following questions:
1. What is the level of conformity with the ISPS Code within Azerbaijan’s port
facilities?
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2. What security measures that have been taken to secure the different port
facilities and surrounding areas?
3. Why is it vital to assess the security level within the port facilities and what
will define areas for improvements?
4. How could the State Maritime Agency in Azerbaijan secure the
vulnerabilities within its port facilities?

1.5. Literature review
In order to achieve the main goals and objectives, and answer the research questions,
a review of the relevant literature is required. To that end, previous studies on the
implementation of the ISPS Code will be reviewed and summarized.
The literature review will start from general books and articles on maritime security,
and international instruments on maritime security, such as SOLAS, SUA
Convention and ISPS Code. For a deep understanding of the legal framework
regulating security measures against unlawful acts, it is necessary to define the basic
international conventions and codes controlling security issues. Then, national
legislation on security measures and implementation of the ISPS Code will be
reviewed and summarized.
It is necessary to point out here that while reviewing research, related to maritime
security, no studies have been found discussing the implementation of ISPS Code in
Azerbaijan neither in English nor in Azerbaijani. Moreover, the Caspian Sea is a
special case in which some of the IMO instruments are required, whereas other
instruments are not. This dissertation was the first research effort in respect of the
implementation of the ISPS Code in Azerbaijan and its main purpose is to clarify the
effects of the implementation of the ISPS Code in that State.
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Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that after the 9/11 attacks in the US, security
issues became one of the first goals for the IMO. Focusing on the adoption of various
IMO resolutions and guidelines on security measures during the last 15 years is
necessary in order to understand the importance of security measures.
For a better understanding of the difference between safety and security issues and to
provide detailed information on security, including the international legal
framework, research conducted by Maximo Quibranza Mejia will be useful.
On the other hand, for the clarification of the concept of “terrorism”, studies of
Christopher (2015) will be reviewed; moreover, for a better understanding of the
definition of “counterterrorism” and measures which might be taken against
terrorism again a study of Christopher (2015) will be helpful.
The Guide to Maritime Security and the ISPS Code, which was published by IMO in
2012, dealing with maritime security issues is a comprehensive guide for a better
understanding of international instruments related to security measures. The
abovementioned book covered Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS, ISPS Code, and guidelines
on how to carry out security measures. This literature provides a legal framework on
the minimum standards for protecting port facilities and ships from unlawful acts.
Nevertheless, this dissertation will provide clarification on national legislation on
security issues and will also define significant legal challenges related to security
measures.
Furthermore, in order to define challenges and fill the gaps for the purpose of
implementing international and national legislation regulating security issues, this
dissertation paid attention to various data resources from annual reports, official
records, and electronic database of national legal acts. In order for the ISPS Code
provisions to be implemented in the Republic of Azerbaijan, it has to be integrated
into the national legislation; therefore, the purpose of studying the national
legislation is to define the level of harmonization between national regulations and
international instruments represented by the ISPS Code.
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1.6. Methodology
The research was based on two different techniques, in which both qualitative and
quantitative research methodologies were used. The two mentioned techniques
enriched the research and boosted the clarity of the findings.
A literature review based on International Conventions, Codes and National Legislation of
the Republic of Azerbaijan on maritime security was conducted; furthermore, articles by
experts on maritime security from books, journals and websites were used to study the
applicable global standard for the ISPS Code.

The qualitative research methodology was used to describe and analyze the
information and collected data from all sources within the different port facilities.
Such analysis provided a strong base on which a comparison was made between
what has been implemented and what has not been implemented so far, regarding the
SOLAS convention and the implementation of the ISPS code within the different
port facilities of Azerbaijan.
The quantitative research methodology involved primarily data collection; these data
were gathered from maritime authorities and governmental agencies. The statistics
are reliable sources that will reflect the level of security within the port facilities and
onboard ships visiting them; for instance, the increase or decrease of security
incidents will help in defining the effect of implementing high-security measures as
required by the ISPS Code. The nature of the collected data was numerical statistics
and documents about the ships and the port facilities operating within the Republic
of Azerbaijan. Additionally, data were used to examine which of the ISPS Code
principles and guidelines are being implemented, and such data was gathered from
the annual reports of the State Maritime Agency in Azerbaijan. Research interviews
and questionnaires distributed among the auditors of the Maritime Agency and the
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security guards at the port facilities and the crew of the ships that were moored to the
port facilities were a major data source.
The data collection was performed through two different interviews with managerial
level personnel, as well as a questionnaire targeting seafarers, security guards, and
port personnel. The data collection was conducted according to the guidelines of the
Research Ethics Committee of World Maritime University. Finally, the interview and
survey questions, information sheets, tables and diagrams about statistics, attached as
an annex to the dissertation are mainly for the purpose of answering research
questions numbers 2, 3 and 4. The comparison between the national legislation in the
Republic of Azerbaijan and the information collected through the interviews and
questionnaires was aimed at answering question number 1.
The researchers could not travel to Azerbaijan to collect extra data; moreover, the
lack of time was another limitation for the researchers. However, the limitation of the
biased information was compensated for by carrying out two interviews with
different managerial personnel. Furthermore, there were some difficulties in
collecting data about security breaches and measures on maritime security from the
stakeholders due to confidentiality.
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2. The legal framework on maritime security

2.1. Maritime security and terrorism
States around the world and their respective maritime administrations are facing
various maritime security threats such as terrorism, piracy, and armed robbery, which
are different in nature and severity. These security threats are associated with
maritime operations and deemed to be a huge challenge to the international
community which requires international cooperation. In September 2001, people
woke up to a tragic event perpetrated by a terrorist group that shocked humanity and
caused a large number of fatalities and massive property damage. “It was September
11 attacks, which highlighted the vulnerability of the world’s transport system to
attack, triggering the introduction of a raft of new laws and conventions … to
enhance maritime security” (Herbert-Burns et al., 2008). This event raised the
awareness of the international community to the need for a legal framework that
addresses the security risks and establish mitigation measures to enhance the security
level within the maritime field and at the same time reassesses the existing safety
measures, especially in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS).
Maritime safety was the main concern of the shipping industry in the past; however,
the type of risk associated with maritime activities could also be categorized under
the security threats. There is a difference between (maritime) safety and security,
although the consequences might be somehow the same for safety accidents and
security incidents. Nevertheless, the distinction between the two could be seen
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through the intention; for example, a safety accident is unintentional, whereas a
security incident is intentional. “Maritime safety refers to preventing or minimizing
the occurrence of accidents at sea that may be caused by … unqualified crew or
operator error, whereas maritime security is related to protection against unlawful
and deliberate, acts” (Klein, 2011).
The concept of maritime security can be defined in many different ways depending
on the perspective of the organization and the nature of its business. The
military/naval definition is different from the ship operator’s definition and it is also
different from the shipping industry`s definition. According to Klein (2011), the
naval concept in the United States focuses on the aims of maritime security, starting
from navigation freedom and protecting the resources of the seas and oceans, adding
to that securing the maritime environment from illegal activities such as piracy and
drug trafficking. The military perspective is not far from other maritime stakeholders
like ship’s operators; however, they look at maritime security from different angles.
“For operators in the shipping industry, maritime security is particularly focused on
the maritime transport system and relates to the safe arrival of cargo … without
interference or being subjected to criminal activity” (Klein, 2011).
The maritime sector is facing a myriad of dangers, and before any mitigation
measures can be put in place, the type and nature of risks must be defined; therefore,
a list of possible risks must be made. According to Christopher (2015), some of the
threats to maritime security are as follows:
A- Cargo theft
B- Violence at the workplace
C- Economic espionage
D- Maritime piracy activities
E- Maritime terrorism
F- Security guards with poor training
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G- The crime of conspiracy whether it is an internal conspiracy or commercial
conspiracy
Maritime security threats target ports, port facilities and ships. Therefore, the security
risks could be divided into two different areas; the first one is the port facilities,
where the cargo is delivered and/or stored, and the second is at sea when the ship is
making its way through the waters. However, maritime security threats do not
differentiate between these two areas. For example, violence at the workplace is one
of the security threats, and such a threat could take place onboard ships or at port
facilities. Therefore mitigation measures might not be the same as some measures
might be applicable onboard ships but not at port facilities. The effectiveness of the
mitigation measures is dependent on the awareness of the maritime risks and threats,
understanding of their nature and of their impact on the whole shipping system,
including recognizing the most dangerous maritime threats (Christopher, 2015).

2.1.1. Maritime Terrorism
Terrorism is one of the most important security threats to the maritime environment,
and it is expanding the ways it is being performed, and the areas that might be
targeted. According to Galletti (2012), piracy, terrorism, and organized crime are the
major risks to the transportation world deliberately carried out by human being's
activities. Commercial ports and commercial ships are not the only targets for
terrorists; in fact, even oil pontoons and platforms are vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
Adding to that, military warships are also considered targets for terrorism, having an
example of what happened to the United States naval ship USS Cole when it was
attacked by terrorists on the 12th October 2000 while it was near Yemen. Moreover,
terrorist techniques are becoming increasingly sophisticated, and they are using the
latest technologies to perform their attacks. “The threat of maritime terrorism has
increased with the progression of technology and the easy way to dispose of speed
vessels, made of inflated boats” (Uzer, 2012).
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Maritime terrorism is a real threat to shipping companies, ports, and the different
states in general, yet there is no specific definition of maritime terrorism that is
accepted by the international community. However, there are some definitions that
pinpoint the major elements of maritime terrorism specified by academics and
maritime specialists. For instance, ships, ship`s cargo, crew and passengers all get
affected by maritime terrorism and that is supported by the definition of Karim
(2016) in which he defined maritime terrorism as follows:
Any illegal act directed against ships, their passengers, cargo or crew or
against seaports with the intent of directly or indirectly influencing a
government or group of individuals.
It is clear that maritime terrorism is a major concern to governments; however, there
is no adequate statistical data to show the increase in the number of attacks on ships
or ports. The data available on maritime terrorism is sometimes limited to an area or
a specific time period: “The data at hand at the time certainly provided interesting
numbers for the period between 1960 and 1983, during which 47 ships were
attacked, 11 were hijacked, and 12 were sunk or destroyed” (Galletti, 2012).

2.1.2. Maritime Piracy
Piracy is another major threat to international shipping and its routes around the
world, and there are areas that are considered too dangerous for ships to pass through
as the number of piracy incidents is high compared to other regions. The main
question is, what is piracy? And how different is it from an armed robbery in the
maritime sector? “Piracy can only be committed against ships on the high seas or in
the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of states” (Guilfoyle, 2013). Maritime piracy
attacks may take place in the open seas and, according to Guilfoyle (2013), under
UNCLOS, attacks on ships in areas like ports, internal waters, and territorial waters
are considered as armed robbery but not as acts of piracy.

13

Figure 1: Territorial waters under UNCLOS in terms of geographical area.
Source: http://www.vliz.be/

Figure 1 shows the delimitation of maritime zones, in which a crime can be
categorized to be piracy or an armed robbery based on the zone it took place at. The
crime is deemed to be piracy if the geographical area in which it took place is more
than 12 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial waters, which covers the
EEZ and the high seas. It is deemed to be armed robbery if it takes place less than 12
nautical miles from the baseline, which covers the territorial waters.
Due to the huge impact of piracy on commercial shipping, mitigation measures
should be put in place and followed by the different maritime administrations to
protect ships from pirates and to protect ships` crews and their cargo. Hence,
international legislation is required to deal with such an international threat. As a
start, UNCLOS has helped the states to understand the nature of piracy and armed
robbery at sea. Article 101 of UNCLOS defines piracy as:
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Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft.
Piracy and armed robbery take place in areas that are under state’s sovereignty which
enables the states to take all necessary measures to protect their ships against such
threats; however, the challenge is on the international level where more cooperation
among the international community is needed to come up with stronger mitigation
measures to deal with piracy attacks and to protect international shipping as
UNCLOS alone might be inadequate.
The difference between maritime terrorism and maritime piracy is reflected through
the chosen targets, motives, and techniques used to commit the crime. “Motives or
aim, preferred targets, tactics and operational reach, are all factors where distinctions
and similarities between pirates and terrorists could be noted” (Joubert, 2013).
Through the mentioned criteria, the differences between the two crimes are evident.
For instance, in regard to motive, the pirate chooses their target based on the
financial value of the target and the level of vulnerability, whereas the terrorist
chooses their target based on the level of political influence. Another distinction
between the two crimes is the techniques or tactics used; in the case of terrorists, they
tend to choose complex tactics, unlike pirates whose tactics are simple. “The
preferred modus operandi of pirates is an armed attack on large ships - such as
tankers and cargo ships - with the objective of hijacking the vessel and kidnapping its
crew for ransom” (Dalaklis, 2012).

2.1.3. Cargo theft (armed robbery)
The maritime transportation system is facing different types of security threats. Some
of the maritime security threats may take place onboard ships on the high seas and
some may take place on land such as in the state’s port facilities. One of the major
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security threats to the maritime environment that may take place in ports is cargo
theft. “Cargo theft has boomed since the advent of the maritime container- an
unfortunate by-product of the efficient transport of single box carrying tones of
valuable merchandise” (McNicholas, 2016). The process of moving the cargo from
the producer to the customer is challenging as the cargo might not arrive at its final
destination, because it might encounter different security threats before reaching its
buyer. Ports and port facilities are often not adequately protected from these security
threats, considering that they have valuable cargo that is worth billions of dollars to
be loaded, offloaded, or stored, and such cargo can be stolen if proper security
measures are not put in place.
Cargo theft is a serious challenge and an important security threat to State
governments and their maritime administrations, and it has a huge impact on the
shipping system. Understanding how costly cargo theft is will help the international
community to realize how important it is to come up with mitigation measures and
security plans to protect the ports and port facilities. “Worldwide, the theft of goods
in transit likely approaches $50 billion a year or more” (Christopher, 2015). Such
numbers reflect the reported theft, which means it could be even higher as there is
occasion of thefts that have not been recorded or even reported. Since cargo theft has
an impact on the shipping industry as a whole rather than on a specific state, that
gives a clue on how important international cooperation is to protect all ships and
ports to secure the shipping industry and work for the benefit of the world states
economies. One example of how such maritime threats could affect the shipping
industry as a whole is the insurance rate; cargo theft can affect the insurance rate of
the cargo shipped, and cause it to fluctuate.
The critical fact about maritime security which makes it a big challenge to the
international community is that such threats are deliberate, and the people who are
committing such illegal acts do not hesitate to cause harm and damage to the
maritime environment. Those people also have advantages to reach their goals
because they have the time to choose their targets, and they have the time to plan and
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decide when and where to attack. Adding to that, cargo theft might get help from
inside the port either from a single employee (insider) or a group, which makes the
crime easier without the need to take long planning and execution. According to
Talley (2013), the cargo thief without the help of an insider may take weeks to
observe the characteristics of the warehouse, and monitoring the working hours,
access points and the security measures that are visible to the public.
There is no doubt of the importance of international maritime trade to the
international community, and the contribution of such trade to global economies is
evident. Ninety percent of world trade is carried by ships to different ports all around
the world; therefore, any security threat or attack on the shipping lanes, ships or ports
will affect the whole transportation system, and in turn, will affect the different
states` economies. “A terrorist attack to the main port may not only cause damage to
the port itself but would also paralyze, at least for a certain amount of time, world
maritime trade” (Zamparini, 2014). The effort of countering maritime security threats
by each state alone and without international cooperation tends to fail more than to
succeed because the international community shares the same concern, and their
cooperation is required. The security threats, especially terrorism and piracy, could
take place anywhere, but the effect will be on a global scale. With that being said
there is a need for a legal framework that unifies mitigation measures and increases
information sharing in order to increase the level of readiness to deal with maritime
security threats.

2.2. International regulations affecting the security of ships and port
facilities
2.2.1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982
UNCLOS should be considered as very influential legal frameworks that deal with
states’ maritime aspects, and its provisions specify the duties and responsibilities of
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the different states, as well as their rights in regard to the seas and their usage. “It
defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world’s oceans,
establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of
marine natural resources” (Christopher, 2015). For example, Article 24 of UNCLOS
specifies that one of the duties of the state towards the maritime community is to
announce navigational dangers within its territorial waters. Although UNCLOS is a
United Nations convention, it is a wide legal framework that supports the IMO legal
instruments to the point that both frameworks have no clash or overlap.
“Overlapping or potential conflict between IMO’s work and that of UNCLOS have
been avoided by the inclusion in several IMO conventions of provisions” (Nordquist
et al., 2012).
In describing the rights and responsibilities of states, UNCLOS uses the wording
“competent international organization” with a link to IMO. According to Nordquist
et al. (2012), some of the UNCLOS provisions that use the term “competent
international organization” actually refer to the party that develops shipping
standards and rules around maritime safety and navigation efficiency. For example,
“states, acting through the competent international organization ..., shall establish
international rules and standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment” (UN, 1982). Such a positive connection between the legal
international instruments actually strengthens the provisions as they support each
other with no discrepancy, hence the situation works for the benefit of a higher level
of maritime safety and security.
UNCLOS deals with issues related to the stocks of fish that are targeted by the large
fishing fleets, and issues concerning the protection of the marine environment such
as pollution created by ships, especially oil tankers. However, it does not include
detailed information regarding the maritime security threats associated with these
maritime activities. Furthermore, it does not provide any guidance on how to
monitor, control, and mitigate those threats. Article 211 Para 1 under UNCLOS
clearly identifies the responsibilities of states in respect of marine pollution;
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however, there is no specific guidance on how to meet such requirements. It is left
for the states to decide. According to Christopher (2015), the provisions of UNCLOS
give the signatory states the right to control all the maritime activities on issues like
innocent passage, pollution, maritime trade, and navigational and transit issues. It is
worth mentioning that, UNCLOS 1982 has touched upon areas of maritime security
threats such as terrorism. The articles provide definitions and responsibilities of the
world’s states towards terrorism but did not give any specific measures or steps on
how to counter such threats. “All states shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent
in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any state” (UN, 1982).
UNCLOS provisions cover a wide range of maritime issues that concern maritime
activities that are on, under and above the water, yet the details on how these issues
must be administered are not included within the provisions. “The LOSC doesn’t
contain comprehensive and detailed rules regulating specific uses of the sea, such as
navigation, fishing, the mining of minerals… the laying of capels and pipelines”
(Rothwell et al., 2015). According to Chrysochou & Dalaklis (2018), it is very
important for the states to use the sea in a rational and functional way in conformity
with the provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The provisions of
UNCLOS work as a legal framework to help the signatory nations to manage the
mentioned activities in an efficient way, for example dividing the sea areas into
different zones like, the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), internal
waters, international waters or open seas helps the signatory states to control and
manage their resources as well as protect them from pollution or any other threats
that might not be mentioned in UNCLOS.
The benefits of dividing the sea into different areas of “responsibility” could be seen
through how states categorize maritime security threats, for example armed robbery
or piracy, which are mainly attacks on ships. However, the important difference
between these two concepts is the geographical area where the crime took place,
which is well defined through UNCLOS, because in fact both threats (piracy and
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armed robbery) are similar in nature. For instance, if the attack takes place in the
territorial water as specified by UNCLOS, then the act is considered armed robbery,
whereas if the attack happens in the open sea, as also defined by UNCLOS, then the
act is piracy. Such division helps the signatory states to legally exercise their power
and sovereignty to protect their waters and resources.

2.2.2. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974
The SOLAS 1974 provisions aim to enhance maritime safety to protect human
beings, property, and the marine environment through setting up minimum standards
on how the ship is constructed and built, and the type of safety equipment that should
be onboard ships, for example equipment for navigation, communication and for
emergency situations like fire systems. Moreover, SOLAS also contains provisions
concerning the carriage of dangerous goods as these types of products could cause
destructive harm to people and property if they are not handled appropriately. Other
provisions included concern safe navigation in chapter five and many other
provisions that cover a wide range of safety aspects on board ships. According to
Dalaklis (2017), SOLAS describes minimum standards for the construction,
equipment, and operation of ships matching with safety.
Throughout the years, changes to the SOLAS 1974 provisions have been made by
addition or amendment, and all these efforts were to enhance maritime safety.
Although SOLAS 1974 helped a lot in increasing the level of safety onboard ships,
the nature of risks is changing along with the new types of ships and new
technologies. Therefore, the need for a more up to date legal framework is evident.
The need for continuous updates is because the SOLAS provisions have to cover all
aspects of maritime safety, including the new systems, whether they are advanced
navigational equipment, communication equipment or any other technology that is
being used in the maritime domain and needs to be regulated. However, sometimes
the IMO has been criticized for the adoption of new regulations after maritime

20

disasters occur; therefore, to minimize risks of shipping operations strict, rules and
regulations need to be adopted before accidents take place (Dalaklis, 2017).
It is important to mention the possibility of having these latest technologies and other
advanced maritime equipment in the wrong hands; terrorist groups or pirates can
easily get hold of such technology and use it for their crimes. The Automatic
Identification System (AIS) for example, can be used by terrorists or pirates to have
enough information about the ship that is sailing within their region, which makes
them vulnerable and to easy target. In addition, it is very difficult to prevent
criminals from possessing such technologies and using them against commercial
ships, and there are no mitigation measures within SOLAS to deal with such security
threats; therefore, the safety measures within the provisions of SOLAS itself are
inadequate.
Within SOLAS a number of different codes have been added when SOLAS has been
revised, such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code)
and the International Safety Management (ISM) Code. The ISPS Code was one of
the major legal provisions embedded in SOLAS in order to deal with maritime
security threats that were not included in the first version, and that resulted in
stronger mitigation measures internationally agreed and adopted to protect the
shipping industry and the world’s economies.
It is the responsibility of the IMO member states to make sure that the SOLAS
provisions are being implemented on the ground and not just on paper, and these
responsibilities are specified within the provisions. Some of these responsibilities
concern the safety in ports and some concern ships, for instance, the security level a
port is working at should be specified by the IMO member states as required by the
provisions, and the security level information should be passed on to ships
approaching the state’s ports. “Contracting government shall set security levels and
ensure the provision of security level information to port facilities … and to ships
prior to entering a port or while in a port within their territory” (IMO, 1974). These
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provisions transfer to the contracting government the responsibility of deciding the
security level for its respective ports. However the exact measures to be taken in
order to protect the ports against maritime threats are not specified by the SOLAS
provisions, and that is another proof that SOLAS 1974 by itself is not enough to deal
with maritime security threats.

2.2.3. Convention for the suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) 1988
The SUA Convention was a result of an extra effort by the international community
to protect ships and people onboard from maritime security threats. The terrorist
assault and hijack of the Italian flagged MS Achille Lauro by four terrorists raised
awareness of the need for a new international regulation to deal with terrorist acts
that involve different nationalities. This incident showed that the intention of harm
was evident towards the security of the people on board the ship and the ship itself
because the terrorists made it clear that they would kill the passengers if their
demands were not accepted and fulfilled. The incident also highlighted the difficulty
of dealing with such complicated situations that involve different nationalities,
especially from the legal point of view where no specific regulations exist that could
be taken as guidelines to solve the issue. The ship was Italian, and the passengers
were from different nationalities. Adding to that, the incident took place in another
country`s waters, so the main question is who is responsible for the protection of the
ship and its passengers? And which state will press charges on the terrorist group or
person and carry on the trial process?
For that reason, the International Maritime Community adopted the SUA Convention
in Rome in 1988 during the International Conference on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. The primary goal of this Convention
is to have an international legal framework on relevant actions against the people
who impose unlawful acts against ships (IMO, n.d.). According to Article 6 of the
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Convention, each Party State shall carry out necessary measures for establishing its
jurisdiction against criminal acts on board ships flying its flag, in its territorial
waters, and by a national of that State.
The SUA convention increased the level of cooperation within the international
community to protect people and ships from terrorist attacks by addressing other
types of offenses that were not included in other international legal instruments.
According to Nordquist et al. (2012), the SUA convention has widened the list of
offenses by adding three more groups. The first group is about crimes related to
maritime terrorism, such as using a vessel as a weapon to initiate a terrorist attack;
the second group concern the system of delivering Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD), and the third new group are those of offenses are those related to the
transport by sea of persons who have violated the law under the provisions of the
SUA Convention.
The study of the Achille Lauro case informed legislators from the international
community of other maritime security threats that need to be included in the
provisions of international instruments; such new threats are not limited to the
hijacking of ships and jeopardizing the safety of the people on board but go beyond
that by looking at the whole maritime transportation system. The SUA Convention
specifies several offenses that are deemed to be unlawful under the articles of the
convention, and according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (1988),
the deliberate offenses include damaging a ship or destroying it or the cargo it
carries, taking over a ship by threat or force, and harming a human being onboard a
ship.
The different international legal instruments cover a wide range of security threats,
and these instruments are a reflection of a certain incident. However, the nature of
maritime threats could be different even if their target is the same, such as the
maritime shipping industry and its transportation system. For instance, the Achille
Lauro incident touched upon the threat of using the maritime transportation system
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by terrorists to transfer weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and using ships as a
tool to attack seaports. This was not the only case to trigger concern of the
international community concerns. The incident of September 11th 2001 raised the
alarm of maritime security threats and vulnerable targets. According to Kraska
(2017), after the 9/11 attacks, there was an evident major concern about the
possibility of further tragic attacks that could target the maritime field. These
concerns centered on the vulnerability of the maritime transportation system and the
possibility of using ships to smuggle people or weapons of mass destruction and use
them to attack the infrastructure of seaports and oil tankers for instance.
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3. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
(ISPS Code)

3.1 Brief background about the ISPS Code
The terrorist attack on 11th September 2001, which destroyed the World Trade
Center in New York drove the international community to reassess the international
regulations concerning the safety and security of commercial ships, seafarers and
ports as they became vulnerable targets to security threats, especially the threat of
terrorism. The 11th September attack was the reason behind the birth of the ISPS
code as enhanced security measures which were adopted by the IMO member states:
“Global fears of terrorist threats … spurred the IMO to critically review its agenda
concerning vessel and port security facility and resulted in the adoption of the
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code” (Christopher, 2015).
The importance of ship and port security goes beyond the national level, and the
September 11th terrorist attack proved that such maritime security threats have a
global effect and are not limited to a single state. Therefore, the protection of
commercial ships and ports is not the responsibility of a single state; it is the
responsibility of the international community. Commercial ships and port facilities
became a target of terrorist groups, and the international community realized that the
chances of having more attacks on ships and ports were higher, especially after
September 11th, and the need for stronger cooperation was a need more than an
option. “A wide range of maritime terrorist threats and risks were considered
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possible in the aftermath of 9/11, including attacks against ships and maritime
infrastructure” (Herbert-Burns et al., 2008).
Due to the fact that maritime security has become a high priority for the international
community, there is a need for a legal framework that addresses maritime security
threats and establishes preventive measures to counter these threats. Moreover, the
success of this legal framework requires international cooperation. In 2002, the IMO
developed new maritime regulations for the control of maritime terrorism risk and
mitigation of these types of risks with the goal to enhance security in the maritime
field and at the facilities through the ISPS Code (Nordfjeld & Dalaklis, 2018). “The
ISPS code contains detailed security-related requirements for governments, port
authorities, and shipping companies” (Wu & Zou, 2013). The ISPS code is the result
of the IMO member states` efforts to deal with maritime security. It allocates every
contracting government-specific roles play within the maritime domain and specific
responsibilities for the protection of ships and ports, which will eventually benefit
the maritime industry as a whole. “The objectives of this code are … to establish the
respective roles and responsibilities of the contracting governments, government
agencies, local administrations, and the shipping and port industries” (IMO, 2002).
According to Dalaklis (2017), the primary goal of the ISPS is that it enables
maritime stakeholders to discover the maritime security threats, and enables them to
develop security measures, and gather information related to security.
Maritime security threats affect all stakeholders involved in the maritime field,
including public stakeholders (governmental sector) and private stakeholders (private
sector like shipping companies). Therefore enhancing maritime security is not only a
task for contracting governments, it is also the responsibility of shipping companies
carrying on maritime activities. According to Dalaklis (2017), one of the primary
goals of the (ISPS) is to establish roles and responsibilities for governments, in line
with ship and port industries to mitigate the threats of the maritime security. Private
sector activities such as the transport of goods and people (cruise ships) and fishing
are also vulnerable to the threat of security incidents. Therefore, their contribution
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towards maritime security is needed. The international community has acknowledged
the importance of the involvement of the private sector through the provisions of the
ISPS Code that specify certain roles and responsibilities that have to be carried out
by the shipping companies.
The ISPS code was aimed at strengthening the security measures taken by the IMO
Member States to protect their ships and ports; however, there was a challenge of
maintaining an effective flow of shipping lanes and cargo transport with new and
more restricted measures to control maritime activities. According to McNicholas
(2016), the way the United States and the International Maritime Organization
responded to this attack was through the implementation of mitigation measures to
protect the commercial ships and ports, and these measures had a major impact on
the maritime supply chain and the process of moving cargo from one place to
another.
The process of carrying out security inspections of every ship that comes to a port is
unrealistic, and that is due to a large number of ships that are coming alongside the
ports, especially in the areas where shipping density is high like in the United States
of America (USA), China, and Europe. Moreover, the process of inspecting each
ship will have negative consequences for shipping companies, because delaying
commercial ships will result in financial loss, and that is not the aim of the ISPS
code. Therefore, international cooperation and intelligence or information sharing
between the IMO Member States will help in reducing any negative impact caused
by new regulations.

3.2 An overview of the ISPS Code
The ISPS Code provisions were embedded in the SOLAS 1974 Convention, and this
gave the ISPS code a pioneering value over other legal instruments or codes in terms
of security. Such importance was due to the fact that the ISPS Code was not
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considered a new convention that needed to be ratified by the IMO member states
right from the beginning, and injecting the Code within SOLAS means the member
states that ratified SOLAS are the ones ratifying the ISPS Code. Although the
adoption of the ISPS code was on the 12th of December 2002, it came into effect on
the 1st of July 2004. The ISPS Code, through its provisions, specified the types of
ships it regulates. Such ships are the ones engaged in international voyages, starting
from passenger ships (including high-speed passenger craft), cargo ships (including
high-speed craft of 500 gross tonnages and above), mobile offshore drilling units,
and including port facilities serving such ships (IMO, 2012).
The provisions of the Code are mainly pushing towards a high level of protection for
ships and ports, yet there are no precise security measures detailing what should be
put on board the ships or in the port as tools and equipment to protect them. “It is
necessary to point out that the ISPS Code does not specify detailed measures that
each port and ship must undertake to ensure the safety of the vessel/facility against
terrorism” (Dalaklis, 2017). The structure of the ISPS Code was set into two
different parts, Part A and Part B. Part A contains provisions that are deemed to be
mandatory, and Part B contains guidelines that are useful for states` maritime
administrations to enable them to comply with the provisions. However, part B
guidelines are not mandatory. “Whereas part A of the code establishes the mandatory
provisions, the non-mandatory … part B comprises guidelines about how to comply
with the mandatory requirements of part A” (Nordfjeld & Dalaklis., 2018).
The mandatory provisions in the ISPS Code part A contain the objectives of the
code, functional requirements, definitions, applications, security levels, and the
responsibilities of both contracting governments and shipping companies. Under the
ISPS code, there are three different security levels, and they are as follows:
-

Level one (Minimum appropriate protective security measures shall be
maintained at all times).
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-

Level two (Further specific protective security measures shall be maintained
for a period when the security incident is imminent).

-

Level three (Further specific protective security measures shall be
maintained for a specific period when the security incident is imminent).

The major areas that the ISPS Code successfully included allocate specific
responsibilities to the main maritime stakeholders, which are the contracting
governments and shipping companies. Contracting governments and the various
shipping companies are two of the major players in the maritime field; therefore, the
IMO member states acknowledged the importance of cooperation among the
stakeholders in order to enhance the security level by establishing specific
responsibilities and roles within the ISPS Code. Although the responsibilities are
specified by the provisions of the ISPS Code, how these responsibilities are carried
out by the contracting government or the shipping companies is left for them to
decide, and that was the purpose of the guidelines in Part B.
Part B contains guidelines for the contracting governments and the shipping
companies; these guidelines are very helpful to enable those major players to meet
the requirements of the ISPS Code provisions. Although these guidelines are helpful
and they are part of the ISPS Code, they are not mandatory. The contracting
governments and shipping companies are free to consider them or take other steps as
they see fit to meet the provisions of the Code. For instance, under the ISPS
provisions in part A, the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) has to be created and
maintained, but it does not specify what information it should involve or how the
plan should be structured. However, Part B helps the designated authority in terms of
what detailed information the plan should have. The PFSP should specify what
security measures are to be taken in order to protect the port’s facilities, and that
includes the operational and physical measures. “The Port Facility Security Plan
should indicate the operational and physical security measures the port facility
should take to ensure that it always operates at security level 1” (IMO, 2002).
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3.3 Responsibilities of the contracting governments
The contracting governments have different responsibilities under the ISPS code, and
one of the main responsibilities is the process of deciding which administrative
authority will take charge of the maritime security aspects in each IMO member
state. The nominated authority will handle the maritime responsibilities specified
under the ISPS code, and one of these responsibilities is deciding on the security
level the port must work at, “The regulation requires Administrations to set security
levels and ensure the provision of security level information to ships entitled to fly
their flag” (Dalaklis, 2017). It is also the responsibility of the authority nominated by
the contracting government to make sure that the security level decided by them is
being applied on the ground rather than just on paper, which means their
responsibilities, goes beyond the decision-making process to the control process.
Moreover, the port facility security plan and the port security plan, which are
required by the ISPS Code, must be approved by the maritime authority after
revising it; needless to say, the control process after the approval is also a vital step.
Another responsibility for the contracting government is the process of recruitment
for the ports under their authority. They should recruit a qualified Port Facility
Security Officer (PFSO), and a Port Security Officer (PSO), and having these two
types of security officers is required by the ISPS Code provisions. “The code also
establishes the obligation for contracting states to demand port and port-terminal
operators (port facilities) to hire correctly certified port security officer (PSO) and
Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO)” (Nordfjeld & Dalaklis, 2018). Additionally, it
is the responsibility of the contracting governments to make sure that all port
facilities under their authority are in compliance with the provisions of the ISPS
Code and have carried out a Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA).

30

Part A of the ISPS Code clearly states that it is the responsibility of the contracting
governments to carry out the PFSA, and the provisions also state that they have the
option to delegate the assessment process to a security organization that they
recognize as a reliable entity to carry out the task. Although the contracting
government is able to delegate the process of PFSA, such a privilege is not open to
other obligations. For instance, the task of approving the PFSA cannot be delegated
to other security organizations because it is against the provisions of the ISPS code
stated in Part A: “Contracting governments may delegate to a recognized security
organization certain of their security-related duties … with the exception of
approving a Port Facility Security Assessment and subsequent amendments to an
approved assessment” (IMO, 2002).
The process of securing the port facilities is not an easy task, and that is where the
ISPS can be of help to the contracting governments to touch upon areas that could be
vulnerable to maritime security threats. The contracting governments under the
provisions of the ISPS Code have to control all port access points and monitor these
points around the clock to prevent unauthorized people from getting through. The
Designated Authorities of the Member States can apply different security levels for
different ports and port facilities to secure their territorial waters (Nordfjeld &
Dalaklis, 2018). Moreover, they have to supervise all the port operations and take
full control of all activities within the port. With that comes continuous surveillance
of the port using all necessary resources and equipment, starting with closed-circuit
televisions (CCTV) and ending with security guards. The control duties are for all
the areas within the port, including the cargo handling areas and the storage areas.
The control and monitoring processes can be effectively applied when other ISPS
provisions are put in place, and the best example is the PFSA and the PFSP;
however, the contracting government shall carry out testing activities to assess the
effectiveness of security measures within the PFSP. “Contracting Governments shall,
to the extent they consider appropriate, test the effectiveness of the Ship or the Port
Facility Security Plans” (IMO, 2002). The PFSP may require an update from time to
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time, especially after new maritime security incidents take place or new information
is received by the contracting governments regarding imminent danger. Such new
incidents must be recorded and documented, and this is one of the main tasks of the
PFSO.

3.4 The obligations of shipping companies under the ISPS Code
Understanding the maritime environment and the security risks involved within it is a
fundamental factor in implementing the ISPS Code provisions. In order to effectively
implement these provisions, cooperation among stakeholders is vital. “The ISPS
code follows a risk management approach and obliges ships, shipping companies,
and ports to install their risk management systems” (Wendel, 2007). The
responsibility of protecting ships and ports from maritime security threats is not
limited to the contracting governments or their designated authorities; it is also the
responsibility of other stakeholders, for example, ship companies and ship operators.
Under the ISPS code provisions in Part A, shipping companies are required to have a
Ship Security Plan on board the ships they own, as well as a Ship Security Officer
who has specific responsibilities under the ISPS code. “The ISPS framework
includes requirements for Ship Security Plans (SSP), Ship Security Officers (SSO),
Company Security Officers (CSO), certain onboard equipment” (Dalaklis, 2017).
The process of nominating a Ship Security Officer (SSO) and the qualifications they
must have is for the shipping company to decide, as the ISPS code does not specify
the conditions and the qualifications of recruitment. Similarly, the details of the
security measures within the Ship Security Plan (SSP) are left for the shipping
company to decide. “Each ship shall carry on board a ship security plan approved by
the administration. The plan shall make provisions for the three security levels”
(IMO, 2002).
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For further elaboration, the ISPS code requires the shipping companies to have a
Ship Security Plan (SSP) on board the ships; however, there is neither a specific
security plan nor detailed procedures and measures to be followed during
emergencies within the plan. “The security framework is established in accordance
with the ISPS code, which requires the implementation of a ship security plan,
containing a policy, risk assessment procedures, and self-protection practices”
(Cubbage & Brooks, 2012). The SSP must be approved by the flag state that the ship
is registered under, and such approval is given after revising it and making sure that
it has all the information required by the ISPS code, such as the restricted areas
onboard the ship with the measures of preventing unauthorized personnel from
entering them, as well as measures of denying access to the ship for unauthorized
personnel.
The Ship Security Plan (SSP) is best built upon a Ship Security Assessment (SSA),
which is also a mandatory task for the shipping company under the ISPS Code
because the SSA studies the type of ship operations that are being carried on board,
the security threats that the ship is likely to encounter, and specifies the ship’s
vulnerabilities and weaknesses. Based on the information of the SSA, the SSP will
be structured on solid ground, and the security measures will be set by the shipping
company, not by the ISPS Code mandatory provisions. However, the guidelines in
Part B of the Code can be of help to the company when structuring the SSP. The task
of generating the SSA and the SSP has to be carried out by qualified personnel or
security officers who have the proper skills to carry out such tasks. It is the
company’s responsibility to hire qualified people able to accomplish the tasks under
the ISPS Code. However, these qualifications are not specified by the Code. “For
ships the ISPS framework includes requirements for: ship security plans (SSP); ship
security officers (SSO); company security officers (CSO); certain onboard
equipment” (Dalaklis, 2017).
The different security officers that shipping companies are required to have under the
ISPS Code are the Company Security Officer (CSO), and Ship Security Officer
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(SSO). The shipping company has to nominate a Ship Security Officer (SSO) who is
designated to be onboard their ships and to take charge of the security aspects.
Moreover, they should have a ship security plan that contains information regarding
what should be done during a security incident and how to carry on the proper
response to the incident. It is the responsibility of the SSO to make sure that the plan
exists and that it is executed in a way that protects people, property, and the marine
environment.
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4. The implementation of the ISPS Code in Azerbaijan
4.1 General maritime security overview of Azerbaijan
The Republic of Azerbaijan is located on the coast of the Caspian Sea, which is an
enclosed sea, and surrounded by the Russian Federation to the north, the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the south, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to the western sides and
Azerbaijan to the east. The Caspian Sea is the biggest enclosed sea between Asia and
Europe, which became the most important region for its geopolitical strategy after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the sea has one of the richest oil and
gas reserves in the world. Azerbaijan has approximately 713 km coastline on the
Caspian Sea and has transport links through the Volga-Don channel to the Black Sea
and the Mediterranean Sea (The SMA, 2016). Figure 2 shows map of the Caspian
Sea and its boundaries with adjacent coastal states.
Given its geopolitical location, maritime transport plays an essential role in the
sustainable development and welfare of Azerbaijan. Maritime transport is considered
less expensive and environmentally friendly compared with other types of
transportation. The enactment of legal acts on the maritime sphere by Azerbaijan has
strengthened the effectiveness of the shipping industry. Azerbaijan became a
member of IMO in 1995 and ever since the State has acceded the majority of IMO
Conventions. Due to geographically strategic location of Azerbaijan, as well as its
rich oil and gas resources, shipping companies play a significant role in the
development of the country`s economy.
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Figure 2: The map of the Caspian Sea.
Source: https:// www.worldatlas.com/

Furthermore, the region is rich in strategic oil and gas pipelines. A Baku-TbilisiCeyhan pipeline (BTC), which started construction in 2002, and with a capacity to
transport 1 million b/d, was inaugurated in 2005. This was not only an important
project for Azerbaijan, but also a vital project for the region and Europe for export of
the Caspian Sea oil to the world. The mentioned pipeline, which cost 4 billion USD
is 1730 km in length, reaching the Turkish coast of the Mediterranean sea. In 2010,
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan also joined BTC to export their oil. Furthermore,
since 2007, another vital project in the region, a Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline
has served to export Caspian Sea gas to Europe (Ibrahimov, R, 2010).
When the Republic of Azerbaijan gained its independence on 18th October 1991 and
became part of the international community, it became a member of various
international organizations. Azerbaijan became a member of the United Nations on
2nd March 1992; following that period, the Republic of Azerbaijan continued to be a
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member of different specialized agencies of the United Nations, including the
International Maritime Organization (since 15th May 1995) and the International
Labour Organization (ILO). Becoming a member of the IMO means another new
independent State joined the international maritime community (The SMA, 2016).
Azerbaijan realizes the importance of maritime safety and security, as well as
environmental protection. For that reason, the State ratified one of the biggest IMO
conventions, SOLAS, which was adopted on 22nd April 1997 by the national law no
275- IQ (The SMA, 2016). After the adoption of the ISPS Code by the IMO in 2002,
and entry into force in 2004, Azerbaijan as a Contracting State to SOLAS started to
implement the provisions that are required by the Code for developing security
measures on ships registered under its flag, as well as at the port facilities along the
east coast of Azerbaijan.
According to the Merchant Shipping Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the State
Maritime Agency under the Ministry of the Transport, Communications and High
Technologies of the Republic of Azerbaijan is an authoritative body on executing
maritime transport policy (Merchant Shipping Code, 2006). Moreover, the ISPS
Code principles are implemented by the State Maritime Agency (Statute of the
Agency, 2018).
The State Maritime Agency required all port facilities to implement the requirements
of the ISPS Code. Although there were only four port facilities implementing the
requirements of the Code at the beginning, the number of declared port facilities has
been increasing steadily. Currently, eight declared port facilities are accepting ships
engaged in international voyages and mobile offshore drilling units (IMO, 2019).
Figure 3 shows the port of Baku, which includes declared port facilities, such as
“Baku International Sea Trade Port” CJSC, Zykh Dry Cargo Sea Port, and Puta Sea
Port.
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Figure 3: The map of the port of Baku.
Source: http://www.worldportsource.com

The requirements of the ISPS Code were also implemented on passenger and cargo
ships engaged in international voyages, as well as mobile offshore drilling units and
International Ships Security Certificates were issued to those ships. Currently, the
requirements of the ISPS Code are implemented on more than 150 ships owned by
10 Shipping Companies in Azerbaijan. The inspectors of the Agency conduct initial,
renewal, intermediate, and additional verifications each year.
There are also several training and education courses for gaining knowledge of
security measures for the maritime industry. Information on security measures and
procedures are provided to crew of ships, shipping company members, and port
facility security guards by the State Maritime Academy of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, and different training centers (The SMA, 2018).
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4.2. National legislation on maritime security
The Republic of Azerbaijan has adopted more than 250 national rules and regulations
regarding the maritime industry, marine protection, marine transportation, safety and
security at sea, and welfare of seafarers through its Parliament, President, Cabinet of
Ministers, State Maritime Agency and the other Governmental Organizations (MOJ,
2019). The fundamental national law in the maritime field within the Republic of
Azerbaijan is the Merchant Shipping Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan (MSC)
which includes all types of maritime procedures. However, MSC covers indirect
provisions on maritime security. According to 6-1 and 18 Articles MSC, all
Azerbaijan flagged international seagoing vessels shall be issued International Ship
Security Certificates as is required by the ISPS Code.
On the other hand, the Republic of Azerbaijan adopted “The Law on Sea Ports” on
18 April 2014 for regulating the construction of seaports, the operations of these
ports and control of these ports by the State in the territorial waters of Azerbaijan.
Article 13 of the relevant law directly addresses the security of port facilities, which
includes ensuring security measures during unlawful acts against port facilities,
investigation procedures of these unlawful acts and following international rules and
regulations on maritime security. Furthermore, Azerbaijan as a Contracting State to
SOLAS, which includes Chapter XI-2 – Special measures to enhance maritime
security, started to implement the requirements of the ISPS Code within the
territorial waters after the Code entered into force in July 2004. During the early
years, the provisions of the ISPS Code and Chapter XI-2 were applied directly to
national rules as a part of national legislation. However, since 2014, the Government
has adopted two relevant Regulations which directly address maritime security and
security of port facilities.
The provisions of the ISPS Code and national legislation on port facility security
affected the Baku port and eight port facilities, which are described in Table 1 (IMO,
2019).
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№

Port

Port facility name

Description

of Initial

business model
1.

Baku

“Baku

approval

International A passenger ship, 10/07/2004

Sea Trade Port” CJSC

passenger

Last
updated
15/02/2017

high-

speed craft, cargo
high-speed
oil

craft,

tanker,

bulk

carrier, cargo ship
2.

Baku

“Cenubtikintiservis”

A passenger ship, 28/06/2004

OJSC

passenger

04/03/2014

high-

speed craft, cargo
high-speed

craft,

oil tanker, mobile
offshore

drilling

unit, cargo ship
3.

Baku

Heydar Aliyev Baku Mobile
Deepwater

Baku

ship

“Azerbaijan Caspian A passenger ship, 16/08/2004
Shipping”

04/03/2014

Jackets drilling unit, cargo

Factory
4.

offshore 12/04/2005

CJSC, passenger

Caspian Sea Oil Fleet

28/12/2018

high-

speed craft, cargo
high-speed

craft,

oil tanker, mobile
offshore

drilling

unit, cargo ship
5.

Baku

Puta Sea Port

Cargo high-speed 28/02/2014
crafts,

an

tanker,

15/02/2017

oil
bulk

carrier, cargo ship
6.

Baku

Zykh Dry Cargo Sea Cargo ships

24/05/2015

14/02/2017

17/09/2018

Not updated

Port
7.

Baku

“Baku

Hovsan Cargo ships
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International

Sea

Port” OJSC
8.

Baku

Zira Sea Port

Mobile

offshore 10/10/2018

Not updated

drilling unit, cargo
ship
Table 1: Declared port facilities in the Republic of Azerbaijan.
Source: https:// www.gisis.imo.org/

Although, “Baku International Sea Trade Port” CJSC is the biggest port facility in
Azerbaijan in size, however, Heydar Aliyev Baku Deepwater Jackets Factory and
“Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping” CJSC, Caspian Sea Oil Fleet are considered the
busiest port facilities for receiving different types of ships. Zykh Dry Cargo Sea Port
is considered a more risky port facility because it is adjacent to Zykh Shipyard
without any boundaries or fences between them. From table 1, it is clear that four of
the port facilities' security plans are updated, in regard to the second port facility and
the third are relatively updated, whereas the seventh and the eighth were approved in
2018.
As mentioned above, the State Maritime Agency is responsible for ensuring
implementation and compliance with the ISPS Code at all security levels in the
Republic of Azerbaijan. Moreover, the Agency is responsible for decision-making,
coordination, and execution of all security changes and attending all types of security
operations together with national security services, police, navy, national border
services, and emergency services (“The Statute on”, 2018).
According to 4.3 Article of “Regulations on the ensuring of the security during
unlawful acts at the ports”, which was adopted by the Decree of Cabinet of Ministers
on 1 October 2015, during unlawful acts occurring at port facilities, a command post
shall be established under the command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which
shall include the State Maritime Agency, Port Facility Security Officer, and other
national security services depending on the characteristics of the unlawful act.
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Securing passengers and crew, defusing persons who hijacked the ship, and carrying
out security measures for securing other ships and port facilities are the main duties
of this command post. Furthermore, during terror acts, security operations against
these acts shall be conducted according to the provisions of “The Law on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Terrorism.”
In the “Regulations on the security of ports and port facilities”, it is clearly
mentioned that the SMA is responsible for conducting and approving PFSA, which
includes the security risk evaluation of port facilities which has to be used for
developing the PFSP. After the completion of the PFSA the port facility shall
develop the PFSP and present it to the SMA for revision and approval. Upon
approval, the auditors shall verify implementation and compliance of the Plan at the
port facility; moreover, a Statement of Compliance of a Port Facility shall be issued
to the port facility (COM, 2014). PFSPs of all port facilities are reviewed by SMA
every five years. Qualified auditors of the SMA carry out PFSA, review, and
approval of PFSP, and conduct initial, annual and intermediate verifications at the
port facilities. These auditors also carry out the implementation of requirements on
maritime security on ships that fly the flag of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The SMA
records revision and approval of PFSA and PFSP, and these records are kept for five
years. After five years, the records are handed over to the archive of the SMA.
The SMA has not authorized any Recognized Security Organization (RSO) to
perform PFSA, develop PFSP, revision, and approval of PFSP or to conduct
verifications and audits. These measures give extra pressures, duties, and
responsibilities to the SMA for doing verifications, revisions and approvals of PFSP
and SSP, PFSA and SSA with a short list of qualified staff. However, for protection
of the national security policy, the SMA is not planning to authorize any RSOs to
carry out maritime security measures, as it is the responsible Organization according
to the provisions of “The Statute on the State Maritime Agency under the Ministry of
the Transport, Communications and High Technologies of the Republic of
Azerbaijan” adopted by the Decree of the President on 22 May 2018. On the other
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hand, the SMA has given permission to various training and education centers to
provide courses and training regarding the provisions of the ISPS Code and maritime
security. In those centers, ship crew and the port facility personnel gain knowledge
on the essential requirements of SOLAS Chapter XI-2, the ISPS Code and national
legislation. Nevertheless, according to the SMA requirements, CSO and PFSO
should attend extra training for better learning of the ISPS Code requirements.
However, the SMA is not only the national authority for the protection of port
facilities and the security of territorial water borders. The SMA does not have such
power and resources to carry out protection functions. These functions are conducted
by other Governmental Organizations, such as the navy, police, border services, and
national security services.
The Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) is in charge of development of the PFSA
and PFSP, as well as for ensuring compliance with all requirements of the ISPS Code
and national legislation on maritime security and instructions described in the PFSP,
such as drills, training, exercises of security personnel, verifications and audits of
port facility, review, and amendment of PFSP and the other procedures are defined in
the PFSP. The PFSO should be appointed by the head of the port facility and should
be under the head of the port facility and should have overriding authority for the
maritime security and protection of the port facility. After assigning the PFSO, the
documentation and competence of the person relevant to the position is verified by
the SMA.
During security incidents, the PFSO shall attend for suppression and investigation of
these events for improvement of the port facility and maritime security, which is
described in the PFSP and shall report to the SMA and record these security
incidents.
After receiving the information about the security incident at the port facility, the
SMA must follow the provisions of “Regulations on the ensuring of the security
during unlawful acts at the ports”:
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The SMA with the other national security services shall check the
authenticity of the report, verify the information, collect extra data, analyze
them and, after evaluation of the risks carry out following measures:

1. If the report is not accurate, port operations shall continue properly;
2. If there is a high risk of the security incident, instructions shall be given to the
ships and the port facilities about changing of security levels; additionally,
security measures shall be strengthened on the vessels, in the port facilities
and in adjacent areas to the port facilities;
3. Moreover, all types of vehicles within the areas of a port facility shall be
removed and access to restricted areas shall be restricted; additionally, extra
security measures shall be carried out as described in the PFSP.
The port facilities of Azerbaijan accept non-SOLAS vessels and ships that are not
engaged in international voyages that fly the flag of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
There are no mandatory IMO regulations for regulating the security of these types of
ships. However, IMO developed “Non-mandatory Guidelines on security aspects of
the operation of vessels which do not fall within the scope of SOLAS Chapter XI-2
and the ISPS Code” in 2008 by the document MSC.1/Circ.1283. The Guidelines
states that:
Member States and other authorities may wish to engage with operators of
non-SOLAS vessels and relevant organizations in developing security
initiatives with respect to education, information sharing, coordination, and
outreach programmes. Member States and other authorities may wish to
consider establishing programmes to improve vessel operators` security
awareness and to promote links with the Administration`s maritime security
services.
Although IMO did not adopt any mandatory regulations on the security of nonSOLAS vessels, the Government of Azerbaijan has gone further and developed
national legislation that covers these types of vessels. In other words, the provisions
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of “Regulations on the ensuring of the security during unlawful acts at the ports”
apply to all ships registered in the State Ships Registry and Bareboat-charter Registry
of the Republic of Azerbaijan and sailing under the State flag regardless of size as
well as foreign-flagged ships within the areas of the port facilities of Azerbaijan.
On the other hand, during inspections of international seagoing Azerbaijan flagged
and foreign-flagged ships by Flag State Control and Port State Control, if nonconformity is found on the security of ships or International Ship Security
Certificate, the ships are detained immediately by FSC or PSC and reported to the
SMA. After preventive measures are carried out onboard the ships are permitted to
continue their operations.
To ensure the safety and security of ships, international regulations require the
carriage of special shipborne equipment on board, including the Automatic
Identification System (AIS). There is a particular requirement in the SOLAS Chapter
5, Regulation 19 which states that:
All ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages
and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on
international voyages and passenger ships irrespective of size shall be fitted
with an automatic identification system (AIS).
However, according to the national legislation of Azerbaijan, all ships regardless of
size, type, operation area, and voyage plan shall be fitted with AIS (MOC, 2015).
This increases safety and positively impact security. Besides, for ensuring safety and
security of ships flying the flag of the Republic of Azerbaijan, a Long-range
Identification and Tracking (LRIT) National Centre was established in 2011. The
main functions of the LRIT National Centre are to track ships, regulate marine
traffic, and control navigation rules in the territorial waters. For effective
implementation of safety requirements and ensuring the safety of navigation in the
territorial waters, the Centre for Safety of Navigation under the State Maritime
Agency was established with the Presidental Decree on 14 March 2014. In addition,
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the conduct of vessel traffic services (VTS) also belongs to the duties and
responsibilities of the LRIT National Centre. According to the Statute of LRIT
National Centre, the Centre carries out VTS to ensure the safety of life at sea,
effective and safe navigation, and protection of the marine environment in
conformity with relevant IMO instruments.
Furthermore, the Conformance of Long-range Identification and Tracking documents
are issued to the national ships which are engaged in international voyages after
verification of competence of relevant shipborne equipment on board. In addition,
one of the duties of FSC, PSC, and ISPS auditors is to verify availability of
Conformance of Long-range Identification and Tracking document on board ships.
Furthermore, there are special provisions in the national legislation of the Republic
of Azerbaijan on the fines and sanctions for the breaking rules and regulations on
maritime security. According to Article 307 and 315 of The Code of Administrative
Violations of the Republic of Azerbaijan, port facilities operated without Statement
of Compliance of a Port Facility and ships operated without an International Ship
Security Certificate shall be subject of the sanctions by the relevant national
authority.
In addition, Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the national rules and regulations that directly or
indirectly address maritime security within the territorial waters of the Republic of
Azerbaijan.
№

Act

Name of legislation

Date

of Description

adoption
1.

The national law The
number 96- VQ

Code

of 29

Administrative
Violations

of

2015

December The

fines

sanctions

and
for

the

breaking the rules

of

and regulations on

Republic
Azerbaijan

the
security
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maritime

2.

The national law The Law on Sea Ports

18 April 2014

number 945- IVQ

Ensuring

security

measures

during

unlawful

acts

against

port

facilities,
investigations
procedures of these
unlawful acts and
following
international

rules

and regulations on
maritime security
3.

Decree

of

President

the The Statue on the 22 May 2018
State

Maritime

The

duties

and

responsibilities

Agency

under

the

the

Ministry

of

the

conducting

SMA

Transport,

maritime

Communications and

measures.

of
for

security

High Technologies of
the

Republic

of

Azerbaijan
4.

Decree

of

Cabinet

the Regulations

on

the 16 October 2014

of security of ports and

Ministers

port facilities

The provisions on
the

conduct

of

PFSA, verifications
of the port facilities,
revision,

and

approval of PFSP.
5.

Decree
Cabinet
Ministers

of

the Regulations
of ensuring
security

on
of

the 1 October 2015

The provisions on

the

the

security

during

measures

during

unlawful acts at the

unlawful

acts

ports

against
facilities.
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the

port

6.

Decree

of

the Regulations

on

the 8

of navigation

at

the 2015

Cabinet
Ministers

September To control of ISSC
of all Azerbaijan

territorial waters of the

flagged and foreign

Republic

international

of

Azerbaijan

seagoing vessels

Table 2: Direct regulations which affect maritime security in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Source: Authors, 2019.

№

Act

Name of legislation

Date

of Description

adoption
1.

The national law Merchant
number 146- IIQ

Shipping 22 June 2001

All Azerbaijan flagged

Code of the Republic of

international

seagoing

Azerbaijan

vessels shall be issued
ISSC.

2.

Decree of the Statue
Cabinet

3.

4.

on

the 4 April 2013

of inspections of the ships

Inspection

of

availability of ISSC on

Ministers

board

Decree of the Statue on the Sea Ports 4 April 2013

Inspection

Cabinet

availability of ISSC on

of Captains

of

Ministers

board

Decree of the Statue on the Ships 8 July 2015

To provide PSC with

Cabinet

the

of Agents

Ministers

necessary

documentation of ships
which is required by
maritime security

5.

The

State The

statute

on

Maritime

Minimum

Agency

Manning of Ships

the 27 February During
Safe 2013

establishing

appropriate

minimum

safe manning for ships
the provisions of SSP
shall
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be

taken

into

consideration

by

the

SMA and the shipping
companies

Table 3: Indirect regulations which affect maritime security in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Source: Authors, 2019.
Overall, the mentioned national legislations are strong enough to secure the ports
facilities which are located in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan flagged international
ongoing ships; however, with more special security measures applied on nonSOLAS vessels will definitely enhance the security level further.

4.3.

The State Maritime Agency`s goals and functions as an executive

body
The 1st Article of “the Statue on the The State Maritime Agency under the Ministry
of the Transport, Communications and High Technologies of the Republic of
Azerbaijan”, which was adopted with the Presidental Decree on 22 May 2018, states
that the State Maritime Agency is the executive body that carries out State control
and regulation of maritime transportation within the territorial waters of Azerbaijan.
The State Maritime Agency as a “National Maritime Authority” is in charge of
maritime safety and security. Moreover, the duties and responsibilities of the Agency
include control of safe navigation of ships and safe and secure operation of ports,
investigation of maritime accidents, attendance at the maritime search and rescue
processes, prevention of pollution from the ships, port state control and flag state
control, registration of ships and certification of seafarers. As an essential part of
maritime safety and security, the pilot service is also carried out under the SMA`s
duties and responsibilities.
Moreover, according to the mentioned Statute, control of maritime security,
verification and certification of international seagoing ships and port facilities are

49

conducted by the Agency. The SMA is a Central Executive Power for representing
the Government at the International Maritime Organization with regards to the
maritime safety, security and marine environmental protection; furthermore, the
SMA has the authority to represent the State in negotiations on international
conventions, and mutual and bilateral agreements in the maritime field.
Article 3 of “The Statute on the State Maritime Agency under the Ministry of the
Transport, Communications and High Technologies of the Republic of Azerbaijan”
adopted by the Decree of the President on 22 May 2018, states the functions of the
SMA:
1. To attend to and, give feedback and suggestions on preparation of national
legislation in the maritime field;
2. To participate in negotiations on international conventions, treaties, and
agreements;
3. According to international conventions in the maritime domain, to issue
certificates for ships agency services, and to give permission to training and
education centers, as well as companies and the individual persons on
maritime transportation;
4. To conduct Port State Control within the territorial waters of the Republic of
Azerbaijan and Flag State Control for ships sailing under the flag of
Azerbaijan;
5. To arrange safety of navigation and to control the implementation of rules
and regulations on the safety of navigation in the territorial waters, as well as
to control pilot services;
6. To conduct registration of the ships flying under the flag of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, to conduct technical inspections on the ships and to issue ships
certificates and documents which are required by the international
conventions, codes and national legislation;
7. To authorize and to control the classification societies and the recognized
organizations within the respective area;
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8. To issue diplomas and seafarer identification documents to national seafarers;
9. To conduct marine casualty investigations;
10. To determine sea traffic and locations for installing navigational equipment;
11. To verify construction, re-construction, and modification of ports, port
facilities, cargo terminals, as well as to give permissions for constructions of
port facilities; moreover, registration of ports and port facilities;
12. To carry out relevant measures for the safety of life at sea and marine
environmental protection as per IMO requirements;
13. To issue Statement of Compliance of a Port Facility to the port facilities with
regard to the ISPS Code;
14. To carry out necessary measures for prevention of a discharge of oil and
other hazardous substances to the sea from the ships regardless of flag;
15. To attend at search and rescue operations in territorial waters of the Republic
of Azerbaijan, as well as to take part in search and rescue operations
conducted by other coastal states;
16. To ensure fines and sanctions of companies and individuals for breaking
national and international rules and regulations in the maritime field.
The structure of the SMA is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: The structure of The State Maritime Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
Source: https:// ardda.gov.az/

On the other hand, Harbour Masters are responsible for conducting Port State
Control within the territorial waters. They provide safety of navigation and pilot
services, control the implementation of rules and regulations on the safety of
navigation in the territorial waters, and investigate marine incidents at ports and port
facilities. According to “The Statute on the Harbour Masters”, adopted by the
Cabinet of Ministers on 4 April 2013, Harbour Masters shall be assigned by the
Director of the State Maritime Agency.

4.4. Possible security threats for maritime security within the territory
of Azerbaijan
Although the Caspian Sea is an oil and gas rich sea, the territorial waters of
Azerbaijan are considered entirely secure. The sea area of Azerbaijan is busy with

52

ship traffic and oil and gas production, and its transportation and maritime
infrastructure; moreover, the oil and gas industry covers the major part of the State`s
income. In spite of various oil terminals, oil and gas pipelines, and other oil
installations, there are no thefts, attacks on important oil and gas installations or
unauthorized access to these restricted areas. The Government ensures extensive
security systems with the support of police, navy, border services, national security
services, and private security services.
On the other hand, there are no threats, such as terrorism, piracy, vandalism or
sabotage on the Azerbaijan side. However, there might be some security breaches,
such as illegal migration, weapon smuggling, theft, or unauthorized access to port
facilities and ships. Furthermore, mobile offshore drilling units, as well as fixed oil
and gas platforms, which are operated for oil and gas production might be the target
for security threats. For that reason, the SMA periodically controls security measures
at the port facilities and on board ships and mobile offshore drilling units.
Nevertheless, there are no security measures mentioned in the national and
international legislation on the security of fixed oil and gas platforms operated at sea.
In addition, security threats to port facilities and ships might include transportation of
drugs, psychotropic materials and other types of narcotic substances on board ships
in cargo. For that reason, the Ships Security Plans (SSP) and PFSP cover special
security measures against these types of threats. However, until now no security
threats or incidents have been recorded on board of Azerbaijan flagged ships, or in
the port facilities within the territorial waters of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
In general, the Government of Azerbaijan and the SMA have made good progress in
regard to the implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code; however,
the data gathering will help to define areas for improvement in addition to specific
areas that required fundamental changes. This will eventually give an indication as to
the level of conformity between the ISPS Code and national legislation on maritime
security.
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5. The ISPS Code in Azerbaijan
One of the main objectives of the ISPS Code is to ensure comprehensive security
measures for ships and port facilities of the Member States against security threats
and incidents. Article 1.2 of the ISPS Code states that the objective of the Code is:

to establish an international framework involving co-operation between
Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and
the shipping and port industries to detect security threats and take preventive
measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in
international trade.
It is necessary to mention that he five Coastal States adjacent to the Caspian Sea
signed a multilateral agreement on cooperation in the field of security in the Caspian
Sea on 28 November 2010. This Agreement includes provisions for combating
terrorism, piracy, organized crime, weapon smuggling, transportation of drugs,
psychotropic materials, and other types of narcotic substances on board ships as well
as illegal migration. Although an agreement was signed among the Coastal States on
security measures, there is no coordination or cooperation on the conduct of security
actions (“Agreement on cooperation”, 2010). In addition, as a Contracting
Government to the Code, the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan adopted
necessary security rules and regulations for the ships flying under its flag and the
port facilities within its territorial waters against security threats. Furthermore, the
State Maritime Agency is assigned as the responsible Organization for the
implementation of these security measures.
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5.1. The State Maritime Agency oversees the security of ships and port
facilities
The SMA has various duties and responsibilities for the implementation of the
provisions of SOLAS Chapter XI-2, the ISPS Code and national legislation on
maritime security:


To exercise control and compliance with security measures;



To verify the compliance of ships according to requirements of SOLAS
Chapter XI-2, the ISPS Code and national rules and regulations, as well as
to issue ISSC to Azerbaijan flagged ships;



To check prepared SSP of the ships and to approve the plans;



To verify the competence and documentation of the assigned PFSO for
their position and to control their activities during the preparation of PFSP
and the implementation of this Plan, as well as other necessary provisions
on maritime security at the port facility;



To conduct and approve PFSA, to approve PFSP and to issue the Statement
of Compliance of a Port Facility to the port facilities;



To set the relevant security level for the ships and the port facilities;



To exercise approved SSP and PFSP;



To communicate necessary information on maritime security and security
incidents to the IMO, the shipping companies and the port facilities.

It is important to note that the security level within the area of the Republic of
Azerbaijan is Security level 1 and has never changed from the beginning of the
implementation of the Code until now. On the other hand, the SMA has never
authorized

any

Recognized

Organizations

(RO)

or

Recognized

Security

Organizations (RSO) to implement of provisions of international requirements or to
conduct security assessments, verification, and certification of ships, and the port
facilities.
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5.1.1. Verification
The SMA controls the proper designation of Company Security Officers (CSO) for
the companies that are operating ships to which SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and ISPS
Code`s provisions apply and Ship Security Officers for every vessel. Furthermore,
the competence of CSO and SSO for their positions, together with carrying out duties
and responsibilities properly, drills and exercises requirements by these officers are
under control of the SMA.
The SMA carries out initial, renewal, intermediate and additional, if it is necessary,
verifications on board Azerbaijan flagged ships to verify the provisions of SOLAS
Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code applied on board. On the other hand, to verify the
port facilities` compliance with SOLAS Chapter XI-2, the ISPS Code and national
legislation, the auditors of the SMA conduct initial and renewal verifications, as well
as annual verifications in accordance with the requirements of “Regulations on the
security of the ports and port facilities.”
During verifications on board ships and at the port facilities, the SMA verifies:
 test effectiveness of approved SSP and PFSP;
 current security threats and patterns;
 competence of PFSO, CSO, and SSO for their position, their documentation
on maritime security, their knowledge about provisions of relevant national
and international rules and regulations regarding maritime security;
 knowledge of security personnel of the port facilities and ship crew on
SOLAS Chapter XI-2, the ISPS Code, relevant national and international
requirements on maritime security;
 existence of security and surveillance equipment and system, together with
the capability of personnel to use this equipment and system;
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 knowledge of security personnel on recognition of characteristics and
behavioral patterns of people who might threaten security, as well as
detection of weapons, dangerous substances, and devices;
 capability of assessing possible security threats which might be occurred
during the ship and the port facility operations and knowledge minimizing
these types of risks;
 ensuring the effective implementation of SSP where ships are sufficiently and
efficiently manned and for protection of the port facilities and a sufficient
number of security personnel and equipment are provided;
 documentation required for security measures is valid and not expired;
 ship`s crew and the port facility security personnel are familiar with security
procedures; moreover, drills and exercises related to ship security and port
facility security are conducted;
 knowledge of security personnel related to their duties and responsibilities;
 control of access to the ship and the port facility by security personnel
(checking the ID cards, bags, and baggage of visitors, baggage of cars and
trucks);
 conduct of internal audits for defining non-conformities and vulnerabilities;
 maintenance of records related to training, drills and exercises, security
incidents, breaches of security, changes in security level, internal audits,
periodic review of SSA, SSP, PFSA and PFSP, any amendments to the
security plans;
 protection of restricted areas;
 handling of cargo;
 efficient operation of radio and telecommunication systems, computer
systems and network;
 existence of Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) on board of ships;
 reporting procedures to the SMA about security incidents and breach of
security;
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 additional requirements required by SOLAS, the ISPS Code and national
legislation.
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Figure 5: The numbers of verifications on board of Azerbaijan flagged ships carried by the
SMA during 2014-2018.
Source: The Annual reports of the SMA.

The verifications of the ships and the port facilities are carried out by five qualified
auditors of the SMA. During the past five years, the SMA has carried out 313
verifications on board ships flying the flag of Azerbaijan, approved 130 SSPs, and
conducted 6 PFSA and carried out 32 verifications at the port facilities and approved
7 PFSPs (The SMA, 2018). Figure 5 illustrates the number of initial, intermediate,
and renewal verifications conducted on the ships flying the flag of the Republic of
Azerbaijan during 2014-2018 by the SMA. The mentioned figure shows that 2017
was the highest workload during the last five years, and that was due to the volume
of renewed verifications. It also shows that 2014 was the lowest workload in the
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same period. Due to the fact that the number of Azerbaijan flagged international
ongoing ships are considered small; therefore, workload ratio was acceptable.

5.1.2. Certification
Certification is one of the vital parts of maritime security. It is not a coincidence that
during amendments to SOLAS and the adoption of the ISPS Code in 2002, one of the
urgent measures was the verification and certification of ships. With the “Early
Implementation of the Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security”, adopted by
Conference Resolution 5, Contracting Governments and Administrations were
recommended to apply verification and certification of ships and port facilities (IMO,
2002). Furthermore, Regulation 9 of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 mentions that every ship
to which the ISPS Code and SOLAS Chapter XI-2 apply might be controlled at the
other Contracting Governments` ports to verify that there is a valid International Ship
Security Certificate (ISSC) onboard.
On the other hand, according to Article 19 of the ISPS Code, after the completion of
the initial or renewal verification, ships shall be issued ISSC. This certificate shall be
issued or endorsed by the Administration or recognized security organization fully
authorized by the Administration. However, as mentioned above, the SMA did not
authorize any RO or RSO for the verification and certification of Azerbaijan flagged
ships and port facilities; therefore, all of these processes are carried out by the SMA.
The Interim International Ship Security Certificate is issued for a maximum of six
months, and the International Ship Security Certificate is issued for a period
specified by the SMA not exceeding five years, as described in Article 19 of the
ISPS Code. Besides, the SMA is responsible for ceasing the valid certificates of
ships. The SMA can cease the certificate of a ship when the ship has missed
intermediate verification, has been transferred to the flag of another State or has
changed its operating company.
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During 2014-2018, 215 Interim International Ship Security Certificate and
International Ship Security Certificate were issued to ships flying the flag of the
Republic of Azerbaijan after the completion of interim and renewal verifications.
Figure 6 demonstrates the number of certificates of ships flying the flag of the
Republic of Azerbaijan issued by the SMA during the past five years. Moreover, 6
Statements of Compliance of a Port Facility were issued to the port facilities
operated within the territorial waters of Azerbaijan during the mentioned time.
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Figure 6: The numbers of certificates issued to Azerbaijan flagged ships by the SMA during
2014-2018.
Source: The Annual reports of the SMA, 2018.

5. 2. Increasing maritime security awareness
Security awareness is vital for safety, security, and health of ships` crew, personnel
of ports and port facilities and other people whose work is directly or indirectly
related to port and ship operations. Security awareness in the maritime industry
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increased against all types of terror attacks and security incidents through SOLAS
Chapter XI-2 and ISPS Code after the 9/11 terror attacks. Security awareness is an
essential component of any security training program. All companies or port
facilities should ensure security awareness training to provide personnel with the
knowledge to determine abnormal or suspicious situations (“A guide to”, 2016).
“Security in ports. ILO and IMO code of practice” provides guidelines to develop
and implement a port security strategy for identifying threats to security. The code of
practice was prepared by IMO together with the International Labour Organization in
2004; moreover, the objective of this Code is to secure ports by facilitating
governments, port personnel, and other stakeholders to reduce the risk or threats to
ports by unlawful acts. Article 10 of the mentioned code states that:
Security awareness is vital to the safety, security and health of port personnel
and others having a place of work in the port, who should be made aware of
their responsibilities to fellow workers, the port community and the
environment. Appropriate training of personnel working in the port should
maximize personal awareness of suspicious behaviour, incidents, events or
objects when going about daily tasks, and the invaluable contribution to be
made to the security of the port and its personnel by each individual. Clear
lines for reporting such matters to supervisors, managers or appropriate
authorities should be included.
According to the Code, this type of training should cover particular roles and tasks at
port facilities for security and law enforcement personnel, people who deal with
cargo handling, storing, and transporting or come into contact with passengers, cargo
and ships, as well as persons whose positions include administrative and support
roles.
On the other hand, the necessity of security awareness is also mentioned in the ISPS
Code. The duties and responsibilities of all PFSO, CSO, and SSO include enhancing
security awareness and vigilance. Moreover, the IMO provides support, assistance,
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and guidance regarding the process of the implementation of maritime securityrelated measures. For that reason, taking into consideration the gaps in
implementation and application of the ISPS Code and for assisting development of
national legislation on the implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS
Code, IMO developed “Guidance for Development of National Maritime Security
Legislation” in 2016, which also provides guidelines on how to develop legislative
acts on security awareness, drills and exercises. “Guidelines on security-related
training and familiarization for port facility personnel”, adopted by the IMO in 2010
mentions that: “Port facility personnel are not security experts; however, they should
see adequate security-related training or instruction and familiarization training to
obtain necessary knowledge and ability to carry out their defined duties and
responsibilities on maritime security”.
Public awareness is one of the vital elements to prevent security threats or mitigate
the consequences of such incidents. According to provisions of national and
international requirements, security awareness is the primary aim of Azerbaijan. In
addition to international standards on security awareness, both “Regulations on the
security of the ports and port facilities” and “Regulations on the ensuring of the
security during unlawful acts at the ports” include provisions on security awareness
and the implementation of closed security systems at port facilities. Enhancing the
effectiveness of security measures via continuous training, drills, and exercises, as
well as conducting audits to identify non-conformities, weaknesses, and
vulnerabilities and correcting these items are significant requirements of both
mentioned legislations. Furthermore, the SMA, shipping companies operating in
Azerbaijan, port facilities, ships and other stakeholders are aware of and try to ensure
security awareness among personnel. Moreover, ensuring the reporting of suspicious
activities to responsible people and organizations might be helpful to combat
unlawful acts.
In order to cope with security threats in the maritime field, an extensive security
regime organized by the Government of Azerbaijan and security awareness
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conducted by the SMA are useful to keep ships and port facilities safe and secure. It
is not a coincidence that there have been no serious security threats in the territorial
waters of the Republic of Azerbaijan or onboard Azerbaijan flagged ships since the
beginning of the implementation of the ISPS Code. On the other hand, during annual
verifications, the SMA controls periodical conduct of drills and exercises for
awareness and preparedness against potential security threats. That proves the
continuous revision of security measures and training programmes positively impact
the security level in the port facilities of Azerbaijan and increase the readiness of the
State to deal with the maritime threats.

5. 3. Achievements of ISPS Code in Azerbaijan
The Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan has taken care of the ratification and
implementation of IMO instruments since it became an IMO member in 1995.
Azerbaijan has ratified 25 IMO instruments and seven international codes required
by the chapters of SOLAS (IMO, 2019).
For that reason, the successful result of the IMO Member State Audit Scheme
(IMSAS) in Azerbaijan in May-June 2017 was not a coincidence. After the audit on
the effectiveness of the implementation of the SOLAS 1974 as amended, SOLAS
Protocol 1988, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, as amended
(MARPOL 73/78), MARPOL Protocol 1997, the International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as
amended (STCW 1978), the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (LL
1966), LL PROT 1988, the International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of
Ships, 1969 (Tonnage 1969) and the Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, as amended (COLREG 1972) only two findings
were made and it was one of the best results among the IMO Member States (IMO,
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2017). It was found that the implementation of the IMO instruments in the Republic
of Azerbaijan had been carried out successfully.
After the ISPS Code entered into force in 2004 the implementation of the provisions
of the Code within the area of Azerbaijan has been carried out effectively by the
Government. It is necessary to mention that at the beginning of the implementation
there were only 4 declared port facilities; moreover, the number of declared port
facilities increased to 8 by 2018. Furthermore, the requirements of the Code have
been implemented efficiently to the ships flying under the flag of the Republic of
Azerbaijan. Currently, the requirements of the Code are applied to more than 150
ships belonging to 10 Shipping Companies. In an overall view, the implementation
of the ISPS Code in Azerbaijan is successful. The security framework has been
increased by the responsible organizations. Although no severe security threats have
occurred, necessary security measures have been taken by the Government to
mitigate the consequences of any potential security incidents.
In addition, for the promotion of maritime security, an effective security regime has
been organized within the territorial waters of Azerbaijan and at the port facilities by
the Government including police, border and customs services, national security
services and the SMA. Various regulations adopted by the Government for effective
implementation of the Code. In addition, some provisions amended to the necessary
legal acts in the maritime field, facilitate the application of the Code. These
regulations include identification and evaluation of necessary infrastructures for
protection, identification of possible threats, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities to these
infrastructures and selection of countermeasures for reducing vulnerabilities and
mitigation of consequences.
There are some advantages to the implementation of the Code at the port facilities:
 higher safety and security, but lower risk;
 strict control at the port facilities, experienced and qualified personnel
recruited to the port facilities;
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 better documentation;
 excellent work conditions for personnel and ships.
However, there are also some disadvantages of the Code observed by ship and port
facility personnel:
 more paperwork;
 extra expenses for security measures and documentation;
 slow work processes;
 extra personnel and various drills, training and exercises;
 cooperation with various stakeholders.
Furthermore, for the safe and secure operation of Azerbaijan flagged ships, the
Government developed special requirements on AIS, which require AIS to be
provided on board vessels regardless of size, type, and operation area. Additionally,
the LRIT National Centre was established under the SMA for safety and security of
those ships, as well as to ensure effective communication and cooperation between
vessels, port facilities, and Governmental Organizations.
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6. Analysis of the collected data

6.1 Analysis of the two interviews data
In order to strengthen the accuracy of the research findings, this research effort used
two different methodologies, including interviews and surveys. The interview
methodology involved human interaction between the authors and managerial level
personnel; however, this interaction was limited to a video call with the personnel.
One of the main challenges experienced in this research was face-to-face interview,
as it was difficult for the authors to travel to the Republic of Azerbaijan to conduct a
direct person-to-person interaction. Moreover, the second challenge was the
information bias, and such a challenge is highly possible if the research was to be
limited to a single interview because such information may include personal opinions
rather than facts. Therefore, a second interview was conducted to overcome this
problem. The managerial level personnel were chosen carefully in terms of the
authority they hold and the experience they have, and such factors were taken into
consideration in order to add valid, precise, and comprehensive information to the
research.
Moreover, for the purpose of covering the majority of aspects relating to maritime
security, the two personnel interviewed are responsible for different tasks and hold
different positions. The first person interviewed was Mr. Seymur Mirzayev, who is
head of Ship Registration and Control on Ship Standards Department and responsible
for the security of ships, as well as the port facility security within the Republic of
Azerbaijan. The reason for choosing Mr. Mirzayev was to acquire accurate
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information from the national legislation point of view concerning the maritime
industry, and specifically the security aspects of it. The second person interviewed
was Mr. Bahram Rzayev, who is the Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) of the port
of Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping (CJSC) Caspian Sea Oil Fleet. The mentioned port
facility is considered to be one of the busiest port facilities in Azerbaijan; moreover,
it accepts passenger ships, cargo vessels, oil tankers, and mobile offshore drilling
units. The aim behind choosing Mr. Rzayev was to get specific information from the
operational side of what ISPS provisions were implemented on the ground.

6.1.1 The structure of the questions
The questions were structured in a specific sequence to get as much detailed
information as possible regarding the nature of the maritime security threats existing
at the Caspian Sea area, as well as the type of security mitigation measures put in
place in order to protect the ships and ports in that area (see Appendix 1). The first
question was aimed at understanding the surrounding maritime environment and how
the SMA is managing it, and the second question sought to clarify the efforts made
by the SMA to plan, control, and monitor all the security measures within the
different port facilities. Moreover, and due to the importance of the stakeholder's
contribution to maritime security, it is very important to see how these stakeholders
perceive the security measures set by the national legislation and the international
regulations represented by the ISPS Code and that was the purpose of the third
question.
Up to date security plans and continuous revisions are vital and required by the
provisions of the ISPS code; therefore, the fourth question was aimed at establishing
whether this requirement is being met and how often the security plan is being
revised. The fifth question was intended to identify the nature of difficulties faced by
the SMA in meeting the ISPS Code requirements, whereas questions six and seven
were about the measures taken by the SMA to enhance the level of readiness of their
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security guards through training programs and regular exercises. Since maritime
security threats affect the region as a whole and are not limited to the Republic of
Azerbaijan, international cooperation and regional cooperation are vital in countering
these security threats. Therefore, the ninth and the tenth questions were aimed at
evaluating the level of cooperation among the neighboring countries in that region in
terms of information sharing and regional security exercises.
The eleventh question of the interview was aimed at understanding the effect of
implementing the ISPS Code provisions on the daily working operations, including
loading, unloading, and cargo handling, whereas the twelfth question tried to assess
the authority level of the Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) in terms of decision
making and how the PFSO is involved in the planning process. The thirteenth
question is linked with the first question in terms of understanding the surrounding
maritime environment by defining the nature of security breaches as well as the
frequency of these breaches if they exist. Question number fourteen is linked to the
third question in order to see the value added by the other stakeholders in terms of
their cooperation in creating a secure maritime working environment, whereas
question fifteen was to clarify whether the different stakeholders are taking part in
the security exercises conducted by the state or the maritime administration.
Part B of the ISPS code is a non-mandatory guideline that helps the maritime
administrations to comply with the mandatory provisions of the code in Part A.
Therefore, question number sixteen of the interview was aimed at clarifying whether
the SMA in the Republic of Azerbaijan is applying the guidelines within its national
legal framework to ensure a high level of conformity with the mandatory provisions.
Question number seventeen is linked with question number twelve; however, this
question aimed to study the security guards involved in the planning and whether
their contributions and opinions are considered in the decision-making process. The
last question was aimed at discovering how both interview participants personally
value the ISPS code and its benefit towards enhancing the security level in their
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ports. The information gathered through the two interviews was compared in order to
make an accurate conclusion that benefits the recommendations.

6.1.2 Analysis of the data collected through the 1st interview
The first interview was with Mr. Seymur Mirzayev, who added a valuable
contribution to this research through his views and his answers to all the questions in
Appendix 1. Mr. Mirzayev`s answer to the first question was very clear in regard to
the type of maritime threats that have a high likelihood to exist. He stated that the
Caspian Sea and the areas around it are generally quiet, and it does not face major
security threats like piracy, sabotage, or vandalism; however, threats like stowaways,
weapons smuggling, and unauthorized access to port facilities are highly possible. In
connection with question number thirteen, which is related to the statistics of security
breaches, Mr. Mirzayev stated that there had not been a single security breach
recorded so far. The responsibility of protecting the eight port facilities in the state is
not limited to the Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) and other security guards
under his/her command.The government provides security protection through police
officers, customs officers, and border services, which are extra security personnel
that help the PFSO, as per Mr. Mirzayev’s response to the second question.
He also stated that the extra security measures are causing problems with other
stakeholders, and the Agency has received complaints from ships coming to the port
facilities and from the truck drivers as well. In connection with question number
eleven, Mr. Mirzayev said that the effects of the extra security measures put in place
as required by the ISPS Code were both positive and negative. He elaborated that the
positive effect was the trust gained from ship-owners and charterers that their cargo
is secure and in safe hands; nevertheless, the negative effect was evident through the
extra time needed for cargo handling which leads to a delay in the ship's operations.
In regard to the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) and its review, Mr. Mirzayev
stated that the PFSP is verified annually by the State Maritime Agency auditors
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during annual verifications of the port facilities, and that is a requirement under the
national legislation. Adding to that, the auditors verify the changes applied to
improve the PFSP every five years as required by the provisions of the national
legislation.
Mr. Mirzayev stated in his answers to number five, six, seven and fifteen, that the
State Maritime Agency did not face any major challenges applying the ISPS Code
provisions within the eight different port facilities in the state; however, a small
number of security guards assigned to protect and secure the port facilities did not
have adequate knowledge about the ISPS Code and its requirements; therefore, the
Agency carried out training programs and exercises to familiarize the security guards
with the ISPS Code provisions and guidelines. Mr. Mirzayev stated that there is an
annual exercise that involves one of the shipping companies and one of the port
facility’s employees in which they familiarize all personnel involved in the exercise,
such as shipping company personnel and the port security guards with the ISPS Code
and the possible security threats. Moreover, on completion of each exercise, there is
a report submitted by the Agency to the port management and the shipping company
detailing the outcomes and giving recommendations for further improvement. He
also said that shipping companies are the only stakeholder that takes part in the
security exercises.
In response to questions number nine and ten, Mr. Mirzayev said that despite a
multilateral agreement on cooperation in the field of security in the Caspian sea
signed by five Coastal States, there is no cooperation among these states in regard to
maritime security, not even information sharing. Moreover, there are no maritime
security exercises between the neighboring states in that region. His response
towards the authority that the PFSO has within the state’s port facilities was clear on
the importance of the PFSO and their role in the port, and that he/she has overriding
authority in the decision-making process and has the power to decide what security
equipment needs to be provided. In addition to that, the PFSO is an important
member of any security investigation carried out by the port authority, and such
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privilege is supported by the national legislation. Mr. Mirzayev stated that the ISPS
Code provisions in Part A are the minimum requirements. Therefore, the national
legislation was the major source of the security measures taken by the maritime
agency to enhance security within the port facilities, and some of the guidelines in
Part B were followed and applied in the state’s port facilities as well.
According to Mr. Mirzayev, the security guards report to the PFSO whenever they
experience any security issue within the port, and they inform the PFSO about any
weaknesses or vulnerabilities they believe to be evident, which proves their
contribution to the PFSP. Finally, Mr. Mirzayev believes that the ISPS Code has
enhanced the level of security within the state’s port facilities through the
implementation of its provisions. For instance, after implementing the provisions, the
port facilities increased the numbers of security guards, identified restricted areas and
strengthened control at the access points.

6.1.3 Analysis of the data collected through the 2nd interview
The second interview with Mr. Bahram Rzayev, PFSO of the port Azerbaijan
Caspian Shipping (CJSC), was another source of information to this research effort
as he answered from an operational perspective on what is being done on the ground
compared to the requirements of the ISPS Code provisions. Mr. Rzayev’s answer to
the first question was similar to Mr. Mirzayev’s in that he believes the region is not
facing major maritime security threats such as terrorism or piracy, and the common
types of threats affecting ships and port facilities are limited to stowaways, theft, and
unauthorized access to the port and its facilities. Regarding security breach statistics,
asked through question number thirteen, Mr. Rzayev said there had not been any
serious security threats at the port facility. He also stated that there are different
governmental entities working together to protect the port and its facilities. These
entities are represented by police officers, national security services, custom, and
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border services, and flag and port state control officers, in addition to the port
facility’s security guards.
Mr. Rzayev stated in his response to the third question that the stakeholders,
specifically ship’s crews, shipping companies, and truck drivers are complaining
about the extra security measures concerning the inspections and the investigations,
and he said that the port security personnel try to explain that such measures are vital
for the safety of people and property. He added that the State Maritime Agency
(SMA) controls all the activities within the port facility. Regarding question number
four, Mr. Rzayev said that the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) is reviewed
annually by the PFSO. Auditors also review the plan annually as required by the
SMA in order to ensure the effective implementation of the PFSP. In addition to that,
and as a PFSO, he submits a reviewed and amended relevant PFSP parts to the SMA
every five years. Moreover, his response to the fifth question was that there are not
many challenges in respect of implementing the ISPS Code provisions; however, the
security guards' rotation process is creating a problem, as the newcomers are
unfamiliar with the Code and its requirements.
Mr. Rzayev stated that in order for them to overcome the lack of knowledge of the
new security guards about the ISPS code and its requirements, the port had to carry
out additional training programs and exercises. In line with question six and seven,
the port management carries out security exercises that involve security personnel,
ships’ crews, shipping companies’ responsible security personnel, as well as SMA
employees. He added that those exercises aim to increase the level of security
awareness among the security guards and to discover the vulnerable areas within the
port in order to take corrective actions with the help of the ships and the shipping
companies. In regard to regional cooperation, Mr. Rzayev said that there is no
information sharing between the regional states or any cooperation. This also applies
to exercises, as there are no mutual regional security exercises between the
neighboring states adjacent to the Caspian Sea.
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In regard to the eleventh question, Mr. Rzayev said that the extra security measures
in the form of inspections and investigations are causing delays in the port and in
ship operations, which makes the ship and cargo owners unhappy; however, they
trust that the port and its facilities are secured. In line with question number thirteen,
he said that the annual exercises with the ships, ship companies, port facility
personnel, and the SMA are a good opportunity to increase the level of cooperation
and coordination, and from their attendance, it is evident that the stakeholders value
the security measures taken by the port facility authority. Mr. Rzayev also stated that
as a PFSO he was provided with security equipment by the port facility authority;
however, he lacks the financial resources to recruit more security guards and to
provide technologically advanced security equipment to protect the port and the
areas around it. He added that their port facility makes use of the guidelines in the
ISPS Code Part B in building their security measures, in addition to the mandatory
provisions in Part A and the national legislations.
Mr. Rzayev said that security guards are contributing to the PFSP through their direct
reporting to the PFSO or the police officers when they see vulnerable areas or
whenever they come across security breaches such as unauthorized access. Finally,
Mr. Rzayev believes that the ISPS code provisions with the national legislations
provide a good opportunity to arrange security-related issues, and he added that by
increasing the number of security guards, providing security equipment, and
identifying vulnerable areas as examples of security measures, as required by the
code and the national legislation, enhanced the security level at the port facility.
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6.2 Analysis of the survey questionnaire

6.2.1 The structure of the questionnaire
The survey questions (Appendix 2) were chosen carefully to answer the research
questions and to cover different specializations within two state port facilities, such
as seafarers, security guards, and port facility personnel. The survey was conducted
at two different port facilities; the first one is the Zykh Dry Cargo Sea Port, and the
second is the Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping (CJSC), Caspian Sea Oil Fleet. The
number of people who participated in the research was 115 participants, of which
seafarers represented more than 50%, and security guards accounted for more than
25%, and the rest represented port personnel, Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping
Company, and Flag States surveyors, as shown in Figure 7. The experience of the
participants in their respective fields varies. The majority have less than 10 years of
experience, with a total number of 72 participants, whereas 19 participants have
between 10 and 15 years’ experience, and 24 participants have more than 15 years of
experience.
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32

Security guards
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Others

Figure 7: Occupation of survey participants.
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Source: Authors, 2019.

The survey questions examined the participants’ familiarity with aspects of maritime
security and their knowledge of the ISPS Code provisions and guidelines, especially
for port facility security guards. It also examined the seafarers’ perceptions regarding
security measures and how these measures affect port operations, such as cargo
handling, loading, and unloading. Questions one to three and question nine were
common questions to all the participants regardless of their occupation or
specialization, and these questions aimed at evaluating the participant's awareness of
security threats and the mitigation measures taken by the port authority. However,
questions ten to thirteen were exclusively for security guard personnel in both port
facilities, and these questions targeted the readiness of the security guards to deal
with the different security threats through training programs and security exercises,
and also examined their level of knowledge about the PFSP, and their familiarity
with the most sensitive and restricted areas in the port.
The last four questions of the survey (14, 15, 16, and 17) were exclusively for the
seafarers, and those questions were intended to study how the seafarers perceive the
security measures, and also to examine whether these measures are being
implemented on the ground and apparent to all seafarers or not. Moreover, these
questions were targeted to evaluate the level of cooperation and coordination
between the ships and the port facility authorities in terms of security. The results of
the survey were compared to the results of the two interviews to have accurate
findings and to answer the research questions.

6.2.2 Analysis of the data collected through the questionnaire
The results of the questions 1, 2, 3 … 9 showed that the majority of the participants
believe that the security level is neither strong nor weak. Specifically, 13% of the
participants believe that the security level is weak, whereas 24% believe it is strong
(see Figure 8). The results of the questions also show that 49 participants out of 115
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believe that the security measures taken by the port authority have a negative effect
on the port’s operations, and 44 participants believe there is no effect. Moreover,
86% of the participants stated that they are inspected when entering the port and the
rest of the participants (14%) stated that they are not inspected, and with the
inspection also comes to the identification card (ID) check. Such figure shows that
the security level in the port facilities is very good; however, there is room for
improvement through awareness campaigns, which will definitely enhance security
by creating public awareness on the security threat. Eighty-seven percent of
participants said that their ID cards are checked before they enter, and 12% said that
they are not checked. According to the participants, the company personnel and the
port employees are issued passcards.
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Figure 8: Evaluation of the security level at the port facilities.
Source: Authors, 2019.

In response to the seventh question, 94 participants said that they are not able to
move freely within the port facilities without authorization, and that represents
almost 82% of the total participants, which shows that the remaining 18%,
representing 21 participants (port personnel and company employees), can easily
move around the port. In regard to question number eight concerning the
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communication and cooperation between the Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO)
and the Ship Security Officer (SSO), 51 participants evaluated the cooperation as
strong, whereas 48 participants evaluated it as weak, and the remaining participants
were split into two categories. Three people said such cooperation does not exist and
13 people said they did not know whether there was cooperation or not (see Figure
9). Such a figure shows that the communication and cooperation between PFSO and
SSO need to be improved with an indicative example of setting up a workshop.
Survey question number nine concerning the availability of security equipment in the
hands of security guards shows that 87% believe that the security guards are
adequately equipped with security tools and equipment, and the remaining 13%
believe otherwise.

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strong

Weak

Does not exist

Do not know

Figure 9: The communication and cooperation between the SSO and the PFSO.

Source: Authors, 2019.
The survey questions number 10, 11, 12, 13 were exclusive to the participants who
work as security guards at the two port facilities (Zykh Dry Cargo Sea Port, and the
Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping CJSC, Caspian Sea Oil Fleet), and the number of the
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security guard participants was 32. The responses of the security guards to the abovementioned four questions were identical. For instance, in regard to their involvement
in the security meeting, all the security guards stated that they sometimes take part in
these meetings but not always. Moreover, all the security guard participants said that
they had security training programs in order to improve their skills. That shows the
skills of the security guards in terms of carrying out their duties and responsibilities
is very good; nevertheless, there is room for improvement through advanced training
courses for selected key personnel involved in the training programs. Furthermore,
the responses to question 12 were also identical, in which all of the security guards
stated that they were involved in security exercises to enhance the level of readiness
to deal with security threats. In addition to that, all of the security guards
acknowledged that they are fully aware of the most vital facilities within the port as
they have been instructed and directed by the PFSO.
The last four questions of the survey (14, 15, 16, and 17) were exclusive to the
seafarers, and their responses towards question fourteen were identical. They all
agreed that the two port facilities, including the anchoring and berthing areas, are
secured and adequately staffed with no vulnerable areas. In regard to question
fifteen, 47 seafarers acknowledged that security guards are present every time they
carry out cargo handling operations, whereas eight seafarers stated that there are no
security guards visible to them when they do so, and the remaining 6 said that they
sometimes see security guards. In their responses to question sixteen, 67% of the 61
seafarers stated that they get instructions from the Port Facility Security Officer
regarding what is allowed and what is not allowed for them while they are berthing
in the port, such as the areas they are allowed to move within and the shore leave
process. Whereas 26% of them said they do not receive any instructions, and the
remaining 7% stated that they sometimes receive instructions (see Figure 10). In
regard to the last question, 37 seafarers out of the 61 said that they get information
about the security level the port facilities are operating within, and the remaining 24
said that they do not get such information. In general, the security measures which
were put in place by the government of Azerbaijan are working very well, as the
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business model is relatively stable. The future changes are not expected to be
tremendous as the fleet of the state is not expected to experience a dramatic increase
in that small area nor the shipping density; therefore, the current system requires
slight improvements to cope with the expected small changes. Such changes like
improving the communication and cooperation issue between the different
stakeholders as well as increasing the number of security guards.
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Figure 10: Statistics about getting any instructions from the port facility security guards
while berthing to the port facility.

Source: Authors, 2019.
The Republic of Azerbaijan has taken extra steps and has gone further than the IMO
requirements in terms of security measures; however, the policy works in harmony
with an international policy, which makes the Caspian Sea and the geographical
areas around it more secure and stable.
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7. Conclusion and Recommendations

Through the general overview of the global maritime legal instruments and the
analysis of the gathered information from the two interviews and the survey
conducted in The Republic of Azerbaijan, there are several observations made that
are related to the security aspects within the state’s ports. Moreover, the process of
comparing the findings of the research methods and the national legislation in line
with the ISPS provisions was valuable in terms of assessing the conformity between
the requirements of the ISPS code and what is being applied in eight local ports.
Adding to that, the information gathered from the two interviews and the survey
helped in answering the research questions. According to national legislation, the
SMA is a Central Executive Power that is responsible for executing maritime
transport policy, and also responsible for the implementation of and compliance with
the ISPS Code at all security levels. In addition to that, the SMA is responsible for
decision-making, coordination, and execution of all security changes and attending
all types of security operations in line with national security services, police, navy,
national border services, and emergencies services
The Republic of Azerbaijan, through the SMA, has implemented the ISPS code
mandatory provisions in Part A to some extent, and made partial use of the nonmandatory guidelines in Part B. However, the implementation process was the
following step after adopting national legislation that is compatible with the ISPS
Code in order to enforce it within the local port facilities. The SMA, through its
employees, is taking major steps in terms of supervision and monitoring on-ground
security-related efforts to ensure the ports’ compliance with the ISPS Code
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provisions. These observations were part of the research findings, and there are other
observations that helped in answering the research questions through the two
different research methodologies used.
Despite the fact that the Caspian Sea is rich in oil and gas, the surrounding area
including the Republic of Azerbaijan is not facing major security threats such as
piracy, terrorism or sabotage. Such threats are unlikely to happen; however, there is a
high possibility of encountering other security threats such as stowaways, smuggling
of weapons, and unauthorized access to the state’s port facilities. Although the area
is rich in oil and gas, there are neither national nor international requirements
regarding the protection of fixed oil and gas platforms. The statistics of security
breaches support the fact that the Caspian Sea area is secure, as not a single incident
has been recorded; however, that does not ensure the absence of security threats. In
fact, it triggers the possibility of not keeping records of security incidents. The SMA
has taken extra security measures in addition to the ISPS requirements in regard to
assigning a PFSO and other security guards, and such extra measures are based on
the national legislation in which other agencies (police officers, border service
officers) are taking part in securing the different port facilities.
The security of the port facilities was enhanced through issuing pass cards to the port
employees and the security guards as they are authorized to enter the port facilities to
carry on their daily work; however, such passcards are not being inspected to see if
the holder of the card is actually the authorized person, and that explains the survey
participants’ point of view in which only 24% believe that the security level is
strong, whereas the majority believe it is neither strong nor weak. This issue can be
resolved through training programs for the security guards and to familiarize them
with the national and international policy. Furthermore, the survey showed that
approximately 14% of the people entering the port are not being inspected, as they
are pass cardholders, and without inspecting the information on the card and the
person holding it, the possibility of unauthorized access is high.
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The State’s port facilities are applying the three levels of security in compliance with
the ISPS code provisions; however, the cooperation among the neighboring countries
in the region is very limited despite the fact that there is a regional agreement
between the five Coastal States. Adding to that, there are no mutual security
exercises on a regional scale to increase the level of communication and cooperation
among the neighboring states, whereas on the local level there is good
communication and an acceptable level of cooperation between the different
stakeholders and the port authorities. Such cooperation is vital especially for the flow
of information, which helps the states to increase the security of the ports and ships
whenever there is an imminent threat, and shift from level one to level two, or three
if necessary.
The PFSP is being tested and reviewed by the SMA at all of the state’s port facilities,
in compliance with the provisions of the ISPS Code. This process is being carried out
annually by the SMA auditors, and also every five years as required by the national
legislation, which shows that the SMA has taken an extra step to maintain an updated
PFSP. Moreover, the SMA demands that the port facilities recruit a competent PFSO
to carry out the security aspects within the port facility and assume responsibility for
the PFSP and its implementation. The PFSO of each port facility has been given the
authority to decide on the security equipment needed to fulfill the task. The PFSO is
also involved in the security planning process and is part of the investigation team if
there is a security incident within the port.
Although all the security guards involved in the survey confirmed their involvement
in the training programs, the challenge as per the interviewed personnel was
maintaining the presence of qualified security guards who are well familiarized with
the code and its provisions during the rotation process. The survey results showed
that security guards are being trained and getting involved in security exercises, but
such programs are limited to the local stakeholders and do not involve regional
stakeholders. In addition, 77% of the seafarers surveyed confirmed that security
guards are well distributed around the port facilities, especially near the important
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facilities. Moreover, the seafarers admitted that they receive instructions from
security guards regarding what is allowed and what is not allowed in terms of
movement within the port.
Overall, the implementation of the ISPS Code in Azerbaijan has been successful, and
the security level has been increased by the responsible organizations. Various legal
acts adopted by the Government for effective implementation of the Code, as well as
some provisions,

amended to basic national legislation in the maritime field

facilitate the application of the Code. These regulations describe the identification
and evaluation of necessary infrastructure for protection, identification of possible
threats, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities to these infrastructures and selection of
countermeasures for reducing vulnerabilities and mitigation of the consequences.
In general, the Government of Azerbaijan and the SMA have made significant
progress in regard to the implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS
Code; however, there are some areas that require more governmental concerns and
other areas in need of improvement.
First, regional cooperation and coordination are vital to enhance the security among
the Coastal States and that will be achieved through regional cooperation by having
annual maritime security workshops and exercises. Second, the importance of fixed
oil and gas platforms to the national economy is undeniable, and due to the absence
of national acts to protect such vital resources, there is a need for national legislation
to nominate a governmental body to take charge of securing these fixed platforms
and establishing specific security mitigation measures to be applied and monitored.
Therefore, there is a need for short, medium and long term plans to overcome this
issue. The short term plans are expressed through training programs, the mediumterm plans are expressed by new legislation and the long term plan involves
strengthening the infrastructure.
Third, the present level of communication between PFSO and SSO is not as effective
as proven by the survey participants, half of whom believe that such communication
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is weak. Therefore, this is an area for improvement through the PFSO, who should
be instructed to have strong cooperation and communication with the SSO as
required by Article 17.2 of the ISPS Code. This issue will be resolved through
workshops between the mentioned stakeholders. Fourth, the security guard rotation
process is causing a major problem, as the trained security guards are being moved
and transferred continously once they gain knowledge of the requirements of the
ISPS Code and the national legislation on maritime security. Therefore, the security
guards should be trained and maintain their positions; moreover, they should receive
more advanced training programs to enhance their skills instead of repeating the
same basic training programs with the new incoming security guards.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 – Interview questions.
Dear Ma’am/Sir,
The purpose of these interview questions is to have an idea on how adequate the
security measures that are being taken within the Azerbaijani port facilities to protect
the port and its facilities in line with the ships approaching it, and it also studies how
these measures are identical with the ISPS code provisions and guidelines. The
interview questions are chosen carefully to study the actual measures taking on
grounds rather than on papers, and that will help in touching upon areas where more
improvements should be made in order to enhance the level of security.
The results of the questionnaire will give a clue on the level of conformity with the
ISPS code and also will help in specifying areas of weaknesses and/or
vulnerabilities, which will be reflected positively on the enhancement of the security
level within the different port facilities in your respected state. The questionnaire and
the data collected will be confidential, and the documents of the questionnaire will be
completely destroyed at the end of November 2019, and that includes both hard
copies and soft copies as well, yet the findings will be used and analyzed in this
research because they are the core of this study.
Interview Questions:
1- What is the nature of the security threats within your region that may affect
the operations of the port facilities?
2- Is there any extra security measures put in place after implementing the ISPS
code within the different port facilities in order to deal with these threats?
Examples?
3- What is the perception of the different stakeholders on the extra security
measures? Positive or negative? Do they cooperate to a complaint?
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4- How often do you review the port security plan in order to meet the ISPS
code requirements?
5- Are there any challenges that may work as obstacles to implement ISPS
code?
6- Do you have an annual scheduled training program to increase the level of
competency of your security personnel?
7- Are there annual exercises for the security personnel to increase their level of
readiness to deal with security threats? What is the nature of these exercises?
8- Have you encountered any security breaches after implementing the ISPS
code?
9- Is there any cooperation within the regional states regarding information
sharing to have upfront intelligence on expected security threats?
10- Are there any mutual exercises within the region to increase the level of
cooperation?
11- Has the implementation of the ISPS code affected the daily port operations?
Positively or negatively? How?
12- Has the port facility security officer (PFSO) the power to decide on the
resources (financial, human, equipment) he sees fit to meet the ISPS code
requirements? What sort of support does he get?
13- According to the ISPS code definitions on security threats, have any of your
port facilities encountered such threats? If yes, what is the statistics, and how
was the response?
14- How do you value the cooperation of the different stakeholders (shipping
companies, port facilities management, suppliers)?
15- Do the different stakeholders take part in the security exercises?
16- Do you apply the ISPS guidelines (Part B), or you stick to the main
requirements as in Part A? do you apply extra measures more than what the
ISPS code require?
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17- Do the security personnel have a say in the implementation of the security
plan? And on what sort of threats they face and readiness they require being
at?
18- As a personal opinion, do you think the ISPS code raised the level of security
within your port facilities? Please elaborate.
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Appendix 2 – Survey questions
Dear Ma’am/Sir,
The purpose of this questionnaire is to have an idea on how adequate the security
measures that are being taken within the Azerbaijani port facilities to protect the port
and its facilities in line with the ships approaching it, and it also studies how these
measures are identical with the ISPS code provisions and guidelines. The
questionnaire is anonymous, and the names of participants will not be included
during the data collection process or the findings.
The results of the questionnaire will give a clue on the level of conformity with the
ISPS code and also will help in specifying areas of weaknesses and/or
vulnerabilities, and as a result, we can come up with valid and strong
recommendations to enhance the level of security within the different port facilities
in Azerbaijan. The questionnaire and the data collected will be confidential, and the
documents of the questionnaire will be completely destroyed at the end of November
2019, and that includes both hard copies and soft copies as well, yet the findings will
be used and analyzed in this research because they are the core of this study.
Survey Questionnaire
1) Occupation:
A= security guard, B= seafarer, C=port personnel, D= other (please specify):
………………………..
2) Experience:
A=less than 10 years, B= 10 to 15, C= more than 15 years
3) How do you evaluate the security level at the port facilities?
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A=Strong, B= weak, C= middle
4) Does the level chosen in Q3 affect the port’s operations?
A=yes, B=no, C=don’t know
5) Do you get inspected before entering the port?
A= yes, B= no, because (Min. 25, Max. 150). ……………..
6) Do you get your ID checked before entering the port facility?
A=yes, B=no, because (Min. 25, Max. 150). ……………….
7) Can you move freely within the port facility’s sections, buildings, facilities,
without an authorization?
A=yes, B=no, because (Min. 25, Max. 150). ………………..
8) The communication and cooperation between the Ship Security Officer and the
Port Facility Security Officer is
A= strong, B= weak, C= doesn’t exist, D= don’t know, please elaborate: (Min. 25,
Max. 150). …………………………
9) Do you think the security guards are adequately equipped (communication tools,
vehicles, firearms) to undertake their duties in an effective manner?
A= yes, B= no, C= don’t know
10) FOR SECURITY GUARDS ONLY: are you getting involved in the security
meetings and planning?
A= yes, B= sometimes, C= never, please elaborate: (Min. 25, Max. 150).
…………………………
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11) FOR SECURITY GUARDS ONLY: do you have security training programs to
enhance and improve your skills?
A= yes, B = never. If yes, how often: …………
12) FOR SECURITY GUARDS ONLY: do you have drill exercises on security
threats within the port facility?
A= yes, B= no, if yes, how often: ………………
13) FOR SECURITY GUARDS ONLY: are you aware of the most vital assets and
facilities within the port facility that has to be protected?
A= yes, B= no, C= I haven’t been told
14) FOR SEAFARERS ONLY: In your opinions, do you consider port facilities,
including anchoring and berthing areas, are adequately manned and secured or
vulnerable to security threats?
A= Secure, B= vulnerable, because (Min. 25, Max. 150) …………..
15) FOR SEAFARERS ONLY: while you are at the port facility, do you see port
security guards supervising cargo handling?
A= yes, B= no, C= sometimes, please elaborate: (Min. 25, Max. 150)
.…………………………
16) FOR SEAFARERS ONLY: Do you get any instructions from the port facility
security guards on what is allowed and not allowed to do while berthing at the
port facility? For example, areas to move within and process of shore leave?
A= yes, B= no, C= sometimes, please elaborate (Min. 25, Max. 150)
…………………………
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17) FOR SEAFARERS ONLY: Do you receive any information from the port
facility regarding the security level it is operating within while the ship
approaching?
A= yes, B= no, C= sometimes, please elaborate: (Min. 25, Max. 150)
…………………………
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Appendix 3 – The form of International Ship Security Certificate
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Appendix 4 – The form of Statement of Compliance of a Port Facility
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